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ABSTRACT 
The North Korean refugee issue is a challenge to regional stability.  In addition to 
humanitarian concerns, a mass flow of refugees would have enormous impact on 
operations of the Republic of Korea's military and the U.S. forces stationed in Korea and 
Japan.  Regional players have an obligation to contribute to regional security.  Proactive 
and cooperative policy making by China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the United 
States to protect North Korean workers and help North Korean immigrants assimilate 
could diminish the destabilizing triggers of the refugee issue and offer multiple benefits, 
including increased regional stability.    
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I. THE NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE SITUATION 
[W]hat terrifies South Koreans more than North Korean missiles is North 
Korean refugees pouring South. The Chinese, for their part, have 
nightmare visions of millions of North Korean refugees heading north 
over the Yalu River into Manchuria.1 
A.  INTRODUCTION   
In the minds of most international observers, North Korea is associated with Kim 
Jong Il and his nuclear brinksmanship.  The international community and especially the 
countries involved in the Six-Party talks—the United States, Republic of Korea (ROK or 
South Korea), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), 
People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), Japan and Russia—have concerns about the 
immediate and long-term impact of North Korean nuclear proliferation on Northeast 
Asia.   
However, the North Korean nuclear program is not the only contentious issue in 
Northeast Asia.  In the competition for resources and attention in the policy realm, 
humanitarian issues frequently fall in line behind security issues.  But in the Northeast 
Asian region, the humanitarian plight of North Korean refugees has a strong potential for 
quickly destabilizing the region, thus jeopardizing its security.  The North Korean refugee 
situation might directly impact the delicate political balance among the Six-Party nations.  
How each country addresses this issue can affect its future influence within the region.  
Ignoring the issue poses the risk of a sudden change scenario accompanied by a mass 
flood of refugees. This thesis advocates policies to remove the triggers that might cause a 
refugee flow.  Any nation taking a proactive stance on the refugee issue stands to gain 
long-term influence within the region. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Robert D. Kaplan, "When North Korea Falls," Atlantic Monthly, October 2006. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200610/kaplan-korea, accessed 8 October 2007. 
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B. PLAN OF THE THESIS 
 This thesis explores each of the Six Party nations’ stakes in the refugee issue, the 
issue's potential impact on stability in Northeast Asia and the resultant risk to U.S. 
regional security. This exploration and analysis is followed by recommendations for 
proactive planning to anticipate and prevent potentially destabilizing refugee movement.  
The research methodology includes a review of the relevant literature, supported by 
conference attendance and personal interviews.2  
Chapter I presents the background of the North Korean refugee situation, its 
magnitude and causes, and how it is becoming a growing humanitarian and security 
issue.  The chapter reviews the legal history of the term “refugee,” which is important for 
evaluating China’s claim that North Korean refugees are economic migrants. The 
discussion describes how the refugee issue was thrust into the international spotlight, and 
the reactions of each of the Six Party governments. 
Chapter II describes the security implications of the North Korean refugee 
situation for the Northeast Asia region and U.S. national interests.  A large U.S. military 
presence is stationed in Korea and Japan to defend the Republic of Korea against North 
Korean aggression.  In addition to the uncertainties surrounding the Kim Jong Il regime 
and its nuclear threat, regional instability would increase with a sudden change scenario.  
The chapter traces changes in the ROK–U.S. command relationship and describes how 
the ROK’s growing independence and sovereignty impact the U.S. military role on the 
peninsula with particular attention to potential refugee issues.  It explores the 
implications for the U.S., ROK, and coalition militaries if a refugee-related crisis 
threatens regional stability, focusing on challenges to related coalition operations posed 
by constraints on information sharing and logistical planning. The chapter proposes that 
shifting emphasis in an annual exercise to a humanitarian refugee scenario would better 
prepare military and civilians for a refugee-related crisis, enhance command capabilities, 
                                                 
2 Interviews were conducted by the author during travel to Yanji and Tumen, China for primary source 
data.  Because interviewees include members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that provide 
assistance to North Korean refugees, their names are not included for security reasons.  
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increase UN Command Sending State participation, improve communications and 
logistics planning, and strengthen the overall coalition.   
Chapter III reviews the stakes of each Six Party nation in the North Korean 
refugee issue, covering each country’s historical relationship with North Korea, the 
makeup of the ethnic Korean communities in Japan, Russia, and China, their immigration 
history and the unique characteristics of each diaspora.  The chapter describes the major 
social problems associated with North Koreans’ resettlement in the Republic of Korea, as 
well as the implications of North Koreans’ resettlement in the United States. 
The history of ethnic Koreans in other countries sets the stage for assessment of 
each nation’s ability and desire to provide the infrastructure necessary to absorb North 
Koreans into their society.  Successful assimilation of North Koreans in other countries 
might have positive reach back to North Korean development. Each of the Six-Party 
nations has a vested interest in Northeast Asian stability.  If these nations were to 
collectively adopt a solution to the refugee crisis, it might have a positive impact on the 
nuclear issue and contribute to the long-term prosperity and security of the region. 
Chapter IV presents policy recommendations for each Six-Party nation based on 
each nation's historical ties with North Korea, its current economic and political situation, 
and the potential receiving population within their country.  The chapter addresses the 
implications of allowing North Korean refugees to immigrate into each country, outlines 
the required infrastructure and social programs, and evaluates the chances of successful 
integration in each country’s social and economic structure. 
Overall, this thesis aims to inform the reader of the magnitude of the North 
Korean refugee issue, and by providing the background of the issue along with the 
history of North Korea’s relations with the other Six-Party nations, illustrates how this 
humanitarian issue also affects the security of the Northeast Asian region. The thesis 
advocates implementing a proactive policy that will both contribute to regional security 




C. BACKGROUND OF THE NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE SITUATION 
The decline of the North Korean economy since 1990, combined with several 
natural disasters, led to famine conditions that dramatically increased the death rate in 
North Korea.  The famine peaked in 1996–1997, resulting in 50 deaths per 1,000 people.  
A recent slight decrease in famine deaths may be ascribed to the ad hoc personal garden 
plot created with the silent consent of the North Korean regime, mainly to allow a 
temporary pressure valve for the food crisis.3  The number of total deaths in North Korea 
is difficult to document, but estimates range from 600,000 to one million, equating to 
between three and five percent of a population of about 20 million.4 
This dire situation has forced many North Koreans, particularly in the northwest 
provinces, to leave the country.  This is further exacerbated by the DPRK’s “military 
first” policy that channels most of the nation’s food resources to the government elite and 
the armed forces.5  Most who leave North Korea can be classified into one of two 
categories:  economic migrants, who cross the border multiple times to seek work and 
make money, and refugees, who leave North Korea to escape political persecution. 
The categorization of these North Koreans is a politically charged issue.  On the 
one hand, China’s government regards them all as economic migrants, and does not 
recognize any North Koreans entering China as refugees.6 On the other hand, various 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian organizations refer to them as 
refugees, not economic migrants.  What distinguishes these two groups?   
The 1951 Refugee Convention provides the answer.  The Refugee Convention 
was adopted on July 28, 1951, by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, which convened under General Assembly 
                                                 
3 Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace:  International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social 
Change in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 81-82. 
4 Haggard and Noland analyze different sources of statistics and the methodology used to extrapolate 
the numbers.  Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea:  Markets, Aid and Reform 
(New York:  Columbia University Press, 2007), 73-76. 
5 Smith, 85-86. 
6 Joshua Kurlantzick and Jana Mason, “North Korean Refugees:  The Chinese Dimension,” in Stephan 
Haggard and Marcus Noland, editors, The North Korean Refugee Crisis:  Human Rights and International 
Response (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2006), 37. 
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resolution 429 (V) of December 14, 1950.  The Convention went into force on April 22, 
1954, in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention.7  The basis of the Refugee 
Convention is to protect refugees from persecution in other countries through one critical 
element, the principle of “non-refoulement,” which prohibits expulsion or return of 
refugees.  Article 33 of the 1951 Convention states,  
No Contracting State shall expel or return [refouler8] a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 9 
The controversy does not lie in the principle of refoulement, but rather in the 
definition of the word “refugee” itself, as well as the question of whether a convention 
written for a specific situation long ago can apply in today’s refugee situation.  According 
to the Convention of 1951, a person can be considered a refugee if their status is “a result 
of events occurring before 1 January 1951” and the person has a  
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it.10 
The definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention presents a problematic 
technicality in that it excludes anyone who became a refugee post-1951, or who was not a 
refugee in Europe.  However, the Protocol of 1967 changes what constitutes a refugee by 
deleting the time and geographical requirements.11  Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the Protocol 
                                                 
7 Introductory note of the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3b66c2aa10, accessed 
1 April 2009.    
8 French term meaning “to force back” or “to turn away.”  French-English Collins Dictionary 
http://dictionary.reverso.net/french-english/refouler, accessed 1 April 2009.  
9 The 1951 Refugee Convention, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm, 
accessed 1 April 2009.  
10 The 1951 Refugee Convention.  
11 Bill Frelick, “Evolution of the Term ‘Refugee,”  U.S. Committee for Refugees website, 
www.refugees.org/news/fact_sheets/refugee_definition.htm (accessed 8 January 2005; site discontinued). 
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states that the term “refugee” shall “mean any person within the definition of article 1 of 
the Convention as if the words ‘As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951…’ 
and the words ‘…as a result of such events,’ in Article 1 A(2) were omitted.”  In 
Paragraph 3, the Protocol further states, “The present Protocol shall be applied by the 
States Parties hereto without any geographic limitation.”12  
The intent in delineating the terms is to clarify what the signatories pledge to 
uphold.  China, the ROK, Japan, Russia, and the United States are all signatories to the 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol; North Korea is not.  Given the formal definition, the 
categories of economic migrant and refugee are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
Furthermore, there is nothing that keeps one from starting out as an economic migrant 
and later becoming a refugee.13  The political implication of China's decision not to 
recognize refugee status is that China sidesteps its obligations under the 1951 
Convention.  China does not want to deal with the North Koreans as refugees because it 
worries about opening a Pandora’s Box which might detract from its focus on its own 
economic development.14   
Regardless of how North Korean cross-border migration is categorized, the 
situation is a security concern to the region and hence, to the participants in the Six-Party 
talks.  Independent of the categorization question, there are multiple important issues that 
require closer scrutiny, including instances of worker abuse, human trafficking and other 
forms of human rights infringement.  For instance, North Koreans seeking refuge or 
political asylum often leave behind family who suffer reprisals as a result of their family 
member’s departure.  The regime’s reprisal mechanisms include imprisonment, 
confinement to a “re-education” camps and even execution.15 
                                                 
12 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_p_ref.htm, accessed 1 April 2009.    
13 For that matter, one might start as a refugee and become an economic migrant, although this 
scenario is less likely.   
14 This issue is discussed further in Chapter III. 
15  One clearly documented example is that of Kang Chol-Hwan, who tells how his whole family was 
sent to prison for the alleged crimes of his grandfather.  Kang Chol-Hwan, The Aquariums of Pyongyang:  
Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag (New York:  Basic Books, 2000), 40.  
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Table 1.   Number of Defectors by Year16  
During the past decade, the number of North Koreans crossing the North Korea-
China border and reaching South Korea each year has steadily increased (see Table 1).  
One effect of this population flow is increased awareness within North Korea of the 
contrast between conditions domestically and in other countries.  Over the years, there 
are stories of defectors sending information back to family and friends by returning to 
personally relay what they have seen, or planting cell phones to allow North Koreans to 
communicate with people in China or South Korea.  In one incident, an NGO led by a 
North Korean launched helium balloons over the demilitarized zone (DMZ) into North 
Korea.  Attached to each were a small pouch of rice and money, and a flyer describing 
South Korean prosperity.17  The lack of empirical evidence on how effectively such 
information seepage motivates potential defectors is an important area for further 
research.  Anecdotal claims that smuggled South Korean drama videos affected the 
decision to defect suggest that information seepage into North Korea may contribute to 
future increases in refugees.  
Because there is no reliable tracking system, the estimated number of refugees 
ranges from tens of thousands to up to 300,000.18  Those who cross illegally often remain 
                                                 
16 From the Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Unification website. 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFhumanitarian_settlement, accessed 8 January 
2009. 
17 This came to the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission’s attention when 
members of the Korean People’s Army issued complaints.   
18 Hazel Smith provides detailed information on the problems and inaccuracies of the statistics.  Hazel 
Smith, “North Koreans in China:  Defining the Problems and Offering Some Solutions,” 
http://gsti.miis.edu/CEAS-PUB/2003_Smith.pdf, accessed 30 September 2004. 
Pre-1989:  607 1994:  52 1999:  148 2004:  1,894 
1990:  9 1995:  41 2000:  312 2005:  1,383 
1991:  9 1996:  56 2001:  583 2006:  2,018 
1992:  8 1997:  85 2002:  1,138 2007:  2,544 
1993:  8 1998:  71 2003:  1,281 2008: (unavailable) 
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in hiding, increasing the difficulty of gathering statistics.  Various NGOs have developed 
internal statistics, but those who work near North Korea and most closely with the 
refugees hesitate to provide information, fearing it might compromise their ability to 
cooperate with the North Korean government or lead to persecution by the Chinese 
government.19 
A large population of ethnic North Koreans live in Yanbian, also known as the 
Korean Autonomous Region, located in the Jilin province of northeast China, bordering 
the Ryanggang and North Hamgyong provinces of North Korea (see Figure 1).  Ethnic 
Koreans have long inhabited this area and are co-opted by Chinese authorities to keep 
regional order.  The Koreans are given token positions in local government, but never fill 
any higher-ranking or top positions in the Chinese government system.    
 The Korean–Chinese who reside in that region, and others who work for various 
NGOs, run a sort of underground railroad for North Korean refugees, providing safe 
houses where they can hide from the Chinese police. Late in the evenings, the refugee 
knocks on the door and is taken in and given food, shelter, and money.20  Some remain in 
hiding for months, never leaving the building for fear of being caught by the Chinese 
police.   
The percentage of migrants crossing the border for economic reasons as opposed 
to political reasons is not known.  Some North Koreans have legal authority to cross the 
borders multiple times; those who do not risk deportation back to the DPRK if caught by 
a Chinese patrol.  Those repatriated to North Korea are reportedly subject to numerous 
human rights violations, ranging from forced abortion and infanticide of their new babies 
to summary execution.  Many are sent to prison for punishment or “re-education.”21 
 
                                                 
19 Smith, “North Koreans in China:  Defining the Problems and Offering Some Solutions.” This point 
is also raised by Scott Snyder in Paved With Good Intentions, The NGO Experience in North Korea, edited 
by L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2003), 114. 
20 Based on the author's interview with a former North Korean involved in refugee assistance; the 
source's identity is confidential due to personal security concerns.   
21 Human Rights Watch website, “Denied Status, Denied Education:  Children of North Korean 




Figure 1.   Map of the shared border between the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of China22 
                                                 
22 From United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/korean.pdf, accessed 30 
September 2004. 
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The standard of living for North Koreans in Yanbian who evade deportation is 
dismal.  Their children do not have access to education and proper care, as they lack legal 
status in China.23  Other examples of the plight of border-crossers are more extreme. One 
North Korean woman who eventually made her way to the ROK told horrendous tales of 
being sold as a sex slave, confined to a house and not allowed to leave.  She was then 
sold to another Chinese man, who took her to work and hid her in a “rubbish storage 
place” so she could not run away.24  Some go into hiding to evade the Chinese guards 
and avoid being sent back to DPRK prisons.  Stories like these are repeated in the 
testimonies of refugees who have immigrated to South Korea.25  Despite these 
conditions, many North Koreans still see Yanbian as a refuge; there are reports of women 
who seek traffickers to get them out of even worse conditions in North Korea. 
Events captured by the media in 2002 highlight the international aspects of the 
North Korean refugee situation.  In May, CNN aired dramatic video footage of five North 
Koreans (including a toddler on her mother’s back) attempting to run through the 
Japanese consulate gates in Shenyang, China.  Chinese police pursued and caught the 
woman with the child and wrestled her to the ground, knocking the child off her back in 
the process.  The child stood by crying while the police dragged her mother back through 
the gates, kicking and screaming.26   
This incident shone a spotlight on the handling of a human rights issue by China 
and Japan.  The international community scrutinized the role of the Japanese embassy 
personnel in the incident.  There was some debate about whether the Japanese consular 
staff initially helped the refugees or the Chinese police.  The video appears to show the 
Japanese consular staff standing by as the Chinese officials take away the refugees .One 
of the staffers even stooped up to pick up and hand back the hats dropped by the three 
                                                 
23 From United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/korean.pdf, accessed 30 
September 2004, 8. 
 
24 Testimony of Ji Hae-Nam to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on North Korean Human 
Rights Violation, June 5, 2003, available at   
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/NamJiTestimony030605.pdf , accessed 30 July 2003. 
25 Another detailed source is Kang Chol-Hwan. 
26 “Video twist to Japan-China row,” BBC News, 10 May 2002.  For video footage, see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1978817.stm, accessed 30 May 2002. 
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police officers; perhaps he was uneasy and unsure of exactly how to handle this unusual 
situation.  Eventually, the Japanese government pressured Chinese authorities to release 
the North Koreans to Japanese officials who then assisted the North Koreans with travel 
to the ROK.27  The Chinese government has since tightened security around embassy 
compounds, as well as along parts of the North Korea-China border.  
Since the incident at the Japanese consulate, attention to the North Korean refugee 
issue has increased.  On October 18, 2003, then President George W. Bush signed the 
North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA), authorizing funding to assist the North 
Korean refugees.28  The NKHRA also makes provisions for North Koreans to immigrate 
to the United States, though to date, only about 43 refugees of 6,000 have been allowed 
to immigrate.29  The NKHRA has elicited negative response not only from North Korea, 
as expected, but also from the Republic of Korea, as this is an issue they prefer to handle 
internally.30  However, as evidenced by the reduction of government funds provided to 
the increasing number of refugees resettling in the ROK, this is fast becoming a problem 
the South Koreans cannot handle alone.  
A multinational, multidisciplinary organization to develop and implement policy 
might prevent the refugee issue from destabilizing the Northeast Asia region.  Until such 
policy is created, there is the chance that a refugee crisis might occur.  The next chapter 
 
 
                                                 
27 According to follow-up news, it appears that the Japanese officials allowed the Chinese police to 
take away the refugees, and then changed their minds, most likely for political reasons.  When North 
Korean defectors break into an embassy, it is common for the PRC to demand a price from the embassy's 
home nation. This price usually involves agreeing to install additional barriers to the embassy to make 
future attempts harder. 
28 For an update on the NKHRA, see Steve Wiscombe, "North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization 
Act of 2008 Passes in Congress,” available at 
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=4104, accessed 30 October 2008.   
29 “Ros-Lehtinen Introduces North Korea Human Rights Act Legislation co-authored with Chairman 
Berman may see vote in late April,” 17 April 2008, press release on House Foreign Affairs Committee 
website, available at 
http://foreignaffairs.republicans.house.gov/list/press/foreignaffairs_rep/041708NK.shtml, accessed 30 
October 2008. 
30 For interesting responses to criticisms of the NKHRA, see Balbina Hwang, “Spotlight on the North 
Korean Human Rights Act:  Correcting Misperceptions,” Heritage Foundation, available at  
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1823.cfm., accessed 30 March 2008. 
 12
discusses the military and governmental entities primarily responsible for dealing with 
the humanitarian crisis should a refugee scenario occur on the Korean peninsula.  It presents 
recommendations to enhance capabilities to better deal with such a crisis. 
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II.  SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE NORTH KOREAN 
REFUGEE ISSUE 
Following the Communist regime’s collapse, the early stabilization of the 
North could fall unofficially to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and 
U.S. Forces Korea (which is a semiautonomous subcommand of 
PACOM), also wearing blue UN helmets.  But while the U.S. military 
would have operational responsibility, it would not have sole control.  It 
would have to lead an unwieldy regional coalition that would need to 
deploy rapidly in order to stabilize the North and deliver humanitarian 
assistance.  A successful relief operation in North Korea in the weeks 
following the regime’s collapse could mean the difference between 
anarchy and prosperity on the peninsula for years to come.31 
 This chapter addresses the security implications of the North Korean refugee issue 
for the Northeast Asian region.  There is a large U.S. military presence on the Korean 
peninsula and in Japan whose mission is to defend the Republic of Korea against North 
Korean aggression.32  In addition to the uncertainty of the Kim Jong Il regime and its 
nuclear threat, there is a high risk of regional instability arising from a sudden change 
scenario.   
 This chapter explores the implications of a refugee-related crisis for the ROK and 
U.S. militaries in Northeast Asia and the coalition supporting the United Nations 
Command in Korea.  It begins by describing how refugees might present a problem to the 
military on the Korean peninsula. The chapter then focuses on the military actors 
responsible for security on the Korean peninsula who conduct exercises and would be 
engaged in war fighting and humanitarian relief in the event of a sudden change scenario 
in North Korea. The chapter describes how command relationships affect the military's 
ability to respond to a refugee scenario and explores ways of improving exercises and 
planning. Two major challenges to successful operations are identified:  constraints on 
information, and the effects of inadequate information and coordination on logistical 
                                                 
31 Kaplan, 2. 
32 According to the United States Forces Japan Forces (USJF) website and United States Forces and 
Korea (USFK) Public Affairs Office (PAO), respectively, approximately 50,000 serve in Japan and 
approximately 28,500 in Korea. USJF website, 
http://www.usfj.mil/Welcome_to_USFJ/Welcome_to_USFJ.html, accessed January 2009.  Interview 
between PAO officer and author, 8 March 2009. 
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planning. The chapter explores how focusing an annual exercise on a humanitarian relief 
scenario might help overcome these challenges and forge better cooperation and 
coordination among the parties involved while simultaneously helping prepare for the 
possibility of a sudden change scenario involving mass movement of refugees.   
A. REFUGEES AS A PROBLEM FOR THE MILITARY ON THE KOREAN 
PENINSULA  
 For years, people have predicted the collapse of the North Korean regime 
accompanied by a mass exodus of refugees.33  Kim Jong Il’s regime managed to pull 
through the wide-scale famine of the mid-1990s that many anticipated might lead to his 
demise.  Despite rumors of illness, he continues to maintain a semblance of control over 
the North Korean population, although there are signs that his power has weakened in the 
past decade.  The numbers of North Korean refugees leaving through the Chinese border 
and arriving in South Korea sharply increased over the last 10 years. Estimates range 
from 20,000 to 200,000 refugees in a holding pattern in northeastern China.34 
 Non-conflict scenarios for North Korea focus on regime collapse and address 
mass refugee exodus as a collateral issue.  However, mass movement of refugees can 
present serious security issues as well as humanitarian concerns. David Maxwell outlines 
two soft landing and two hard landing scenarios.35  He posits that the former, which both 
involve voluntary cooperation by the North Korean regime with South Korea, are less 
likely than the hard landing scenarios.36  In the first of the two hard landing scenarios, a 
“complete collapse and disintegration of the national government” is accompanied by a 
                                                 
33 Robert A. Wampler, editor, “North Korea’s Collapse? The End is Near–Maybe,” National Security 
Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 205, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB205/index.htm, October 26, 2006, accessed 30 April 
2008. See also Kaplan. 
34  It is not uncommon for defectors to South Korea to start up their own NGO or help other NGOs by 
secretly injecting outside information to those North Koreans still sequestered from the global community. 
Jack Kim, “South Korea NGOs set anti-Kim leaflet drop in North,” October 22, 2008, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-36092420081022, accessed 30 October 2008. 
35 David S. Maxwell, “Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea:  Implications for the United States 
Military” (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 11. 
36  In the first soft landing scenario, Kim Jong Il realizes he is no longer an effective leader and agrees 
to cooperate with the South in a phased unification; in the second, Kim Jong Il’s power is usurped in a coup 
and a more moderate regime takes his place and cooperates with the South.  Maxell deems both these 
scenarios highly unlikely.   
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“breakdown of the internal security apparatus,” leading to a mass exodus of refugees 
looking for scarce resources.  The catastrophic consequence would be that the countries 
they migrate to would be ill-prepared to support them, which could “cause extraordinary 
population control measures to be instituted.”37  In the second hard-landing scenario, a 
coup is staged and factions struggling for power cause a civil war, which would also lead 
to a mass migration of people seeking both resources and safety.  In short, the most 
probable scenarios for regime collapse in North Korea are likely to involve massive 
movement of refugees.  
In a refugee scenario, tens of thousands of people would move en masse on the 
peninsula. This would complicate military operations enormously should it coincide with 
a conflict.  Even in the absence of conflict, a refugee scenario, with a wide variety of 
logistical, security and humanitarian challenges, might well produce pandemonium.  
Such scenarios would constitute what former Agency for International Development 
analyst Andrew S. Natsios calls a complex humanitarian emergency requiring integrated 
responses from multiple actors, including the military.38 
Experiences in Iraq and the relief efforts for the Asian tsunami, Pakistani 
earthquake and Hurricane Katrina reveal much to learn about planning and coordinating 
stabilization and reconstruction efforts and dealing with the humanitarian needs of large 
groups of displaced persons.  Problems range from the immediate, such as preventing the 
spread of disease and providing adequate nutrition, shelter and security, to the long-term, 
such as post-traumatic stress disorder, separated families, and providing schooling for 
children and permanent homes for the displaced. This list is not exhaustive.  Most of 
these problems require vast resources and extensive interagency coordination.39  
 
 
                                                 
37 Maxwell, 15. 
38 Andrew S. Natsios, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse:  Humanitarian 
Relief in Complex Emergencies (Washington, D.C.:  Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 
1. 
39 A North Korean refugee scenario presents the added security issue of North Korean agents 
imbedded among the displaced population. 
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North Korean refugees present a political and humanitarian issue with huge 
operational implications for military personnel on the Korean peninsula.  As Kaplan 
observes, any refugee scenario would have to be dealt with by the United States Forces 
Korea (USFK) and ROK militaries.40   
B. OWNERS OF THE PROBLEM:  UN COMMAND, UN COMMAND REAR, 
COMBINED FORCES COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA 
The ROK–U.S. alliance is the core of military deterrent capabilities on the 
southern Korean peninsula.  Forged during the Korean War, the alliance has been 
sustained since the signing of the armistice, surviving domestic turmoil spurred by ROK 
President Park Chung-hee’s assassination, the subsequent military coup and the Gwangju 
Democratization Movement. The relationship continues despite anti-American 
sentiments, which peaked in 2002.41  Efforts by the ROK and U.S. militaries to forge 
close working relationships through various outreach programs greatly contribute to the 
maintenance of the ROK–U.S. alliance.42  The Korean People’s Army (KPA) 
continuously attempts to drive a wedge into this tight relationship.  Despite vast 
differences between the previous ROK administration’s policies toward North Korea and 
those of the U.S. administration, the alliance remains strong. 
The alliance's deterrent properties are further reinforced by support from the 
standing coalition of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom.  Of the nations that supported the United Nations Command during the Korean 
War, these 14 coalition countries continue to augment the present-day alliance, pledging 
support in the event of another act of aggression against the Republic of Korea; along 
with the Republic of Korea and the United States, they are collectively known as the 
United Nations Command Korea.  Although they did not sign the armistice, the 14 other 
                                                 
40 Kaplan. 
41 Anti-American sentiments were at a high during 2002 when Roh Moo Hyun ran on an anti-
American platform and won the presidential election. 
42 Some examples are the CFC’s and USFK’s Good Neighbor Programs, which enhance community 
relations between U.S. personnel serving in the ROK and local Korean citizens and businesses.  Also, the 
ROK Ministry of Defense hosts many U.S. service personnel and their families on cultural tours and 
exchanges. 
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coalition members pledge to “again be united and prompt to resist” should there be “a 
renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the UN.”43  
Supporting a major crisis on the Korean Peninsula would be enormously more 
problematic without UN Command Rear (UNC Rear), a major theater logistic enabler.  
There are seven bases throughout Japan where accredited members of UNC Rear are 
allowed to sail or fly in under the UNC flag.44  Because the government of Japan is 
committed to providing support under a previous agreement, the UNC Rear commander, 
an Army colonel, does not need to secure concurrence from the government of Japan.  
Each time a UNC Rear-accredited Sending State sends a ship to port or an aircraft into a 
UNC Rear base, merely informing the government of Japan meets the terms outlined in 
the agreement.  
1. Command Structures 
Unique to the Korean theater is the command relationship between the ROK and 
U.S. militaries, and how the UNC Sending States fit into this relationship.45  During the 
Korean War, President Syngman Rhee allowed General MacArthur to take operational 
command of Korean forces as the commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command, 
the lead command responsible for ROK defense.46  On November 7, 1978, the Combined 
Forces Command (CFC), including ROK officers, stood up for planning and defense of 
                                                 
43 The War History Compilation Committee, The Republic of Korea, History of U.N. Forces in 
Korean War, Volume V (Seoul:  Ministry of the National Defense, 1976), 473. 
44 Not all accredited members of UNC Korea are accredited members of UNC Rear.  Accredited 
members of UNC Rear are Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United 
States and United Kingdom.  Italy and the Republic of South Africa are still listed as accredited members 
of UNC Rear, but are no longer accredited members of UNC Korea.  According to the UNC Rear 
Commander, if an accredited member of UNC Korea is not an accredited member of UNC Rear, they can 
apply through the UNC Rear Commander for accreditation.  The seven bases that support accredited 
members of UNC Rear are Camp Zama, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Sasebo Naval Base, White 
Beach, Kadena and Yokota Air Base, and Yokosuka Naval Base.  
45 Although the United States is an accredited member of UNC, the bilateral nature of its relationship 
with the ROK distinguishes it from the other members.  For an in-depth discussion of command and legal 
issues, see  Donald A. Timm, “Visiting Forces in Korea,” in Dieter Fleck, editor, The Handbook of the Law 
of Visiting Forces (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 443-469. 
46 Won-Il Jung, “The Future of the United Nations Command in Republic of Korea” (Carlisle 
Barracks, Carlisle, PA:  U.S. Army War College, May 3, 2004), 10. 
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South Korea.47  This command structure remained in place until 1994, when peacetime 
control of ROK forces was transferred back to the ROK military.  In the event of war, 
operational control of ROK forces will fall under the UNC Commander, a U.S. army 
four-star general.  After April 17, 2012, that wartime operational command will remain 
under ROK control.   
Many senior military personnel serving in the USFK also have authority in the 
CFC and the UNC.  The USFK Commander, an Army four-star general, wears “three 
hats” as the UNC, CFC, and USFK commander, and carries the title of Senior U.S. 
Military Officer Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK).  With the transfer of wartime 
operational control of ROK forces back to ROK military leadership in the year 2012, the 
CFC will dissolve and be replaced by the ROK Joint Forces Command (JFC) and the 
U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM).  The KORCOM Commander will be dual-hatted as 
the UNC Commander, and both KORCOM and UNC will serve as supporting commands 
to the ROK JFC.  
An augmenting force capability not yet fully realized by the ROK and U.S. forces 
on the Korean Peninsula is that of the UNC Sending States.48  Although the national 
command authority of each UNC Sending State makes its own arrangements for 
controlling their forces in a crisis, any forces contributed on behalf of a UNC Sending 
State would likely fall under the UNC Commander's operational control (OPCON), 
similar to MacArthur's Korean War authority as UNC Commander.49  This will also be 
the case after the 2012 OPCON transfer.   
 
 
                                                 
47  Jung, 11. 
48 For purposes of this thesis, the term “UNC Sending States” or “Sending States” refers to one or all 
of the following countries:  Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and United Kingdom.  The United States is also 
Sending State.  However, as the discussion in this thesis centers around how the other 14 Sending States 
augment ROK and U.S. forces, the term as used here excludes the United States. 
49 Jung states, “Because the allied troops constituted only about 10 percent of UNC ground forces, the 
forces of other UN member states were integrated and attached into the U.S. units of appropriate size as 
they arrived.”  Jung, 3. 
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2. Challenges to Military Support and Coordination: Information 
Sharing and Logistical Planning 
[T]he more sophisticated the country, the more technologically advanced 
its industries, and the more reliant is its policy on the use of defense as an 
overt implement of diplomacy, then the more likely it is that the rules 
governing military activity are nationally centered and exclude 
collaboration with all but the most trusted allies.  Even with the ‘most 
trusted’ allies there will still be a tendency to release information and 
goods only with explicit consent of higher authority.50    
Korean theater command relationships present two major challenges to coalition 
operations. The first challenge is information sharing.  Even in command structures 
where one nation leads a coalition, information sharing is often a limiting factor in 
coalition operations. The ROK–US alliance is more complex; challenges to information 
sharing in the multinational coalition environment complicate exercise scenarios when 
UNC Sending States send representatives to participate alongside ROK and U.S. forces.  
Furthermore, the ever-changing global political climate affects relationships 
among the Sending States, the ROK and the U.S.  These relationships have a profound 
impact on logistics planning, which feeds into the second major challenge: developing 
logistical plans with inadequate information and coordination with the coalition. 
3. Constraints on Information: A Crucial Problem 
Under the auspices of UNC/CFC/USFK, the ROK and U.S. militaries conduct 
two major command post exercises each year, ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN and 
KEY RESOLVE.  Both are rehearsals for wartime defense of the ROK in the event of 
North Korean aggression; neither emphasizes military response in the event of a mass 
refugee scenario.   
Since 2002, the UNC/CFC/USFK has made UNC integration a priority for the 
two annual command post exercises. The ROK–US alliance requires concurrence 
between the ROK and U.S. military leadership before decisions can be implemented.  
The participation and integration of UNC Sending States is limited by the ROK's 
                                                 
50 Stuart Addy, “Logistic Support,” in Dieter Fleck, editor, The Handbook of the Law of Visiting 
Forces (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2001), 212. 
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reluctance to disclose OPLAN information to other UNC participants. The ROK's 
hesitation is justifiable, as all UNC Sending States except France and the United States 
maintain diplomatic relations with North Korea.  Nonetheless, the limits on information-
sharing have far-reaching consequences, especially for logistical planning.  Limited 
information-sharing affects the integration of the UNC Sending States into the two annual 
exercises on the Korean peninsula, which in turn affects planners' ability to anticipate and 
prepare for both war fighting and humanitarian relief contingencies.  
4. Planning without Commitment: The Logistical Challenges of 
Inadequate Information and Coordination 
During the Korean War, the United Kingdom was the first UN participant to 
commit naval forces. They were integrated with the U.S. Navy just five days after the 
start of the war.51  British ground troops, committed a month later, arrived approximately 
60 days after hostilities commenced.52  Today, many of the Sending States have force 
commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Should hostilities or crises develop on the Korean 
peninsula, it is unclear which and how many UNC Sending State forces would be sent, 
and how long it might take for them to arrive.   
Commitment priorities for each Sending State’s troops and equipment are also 
uncertain.  The amount of resources the UNC Sending States can provide varies with 
their level of economic strength.  Their political relations with regional players impact 
their willingness to offer support in a conflict or humanitarian crisis, and their political 
relations with the ROK and the United States may affect which phase of a conflict they 
choose to be involved in. 
If war were to break out on the Korean peninsula tonight, numerous U.S. forces 
would join the U.S. forces already stationed there.  A plan lays out exactly which units 
would come from where, how many personnel would be sent, the amount and type of 
equipment they would need, and each unit’s mission.  For example, a stateside unit with 
F-16s dedicated to defending the Korean peninsula regularly trains and practices 
                                                 
51 War History Compilation Committee, History of U.S. Forces in Korean War, Volume II (Seoul:  
Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1973), 663. 
52 War History Compilation Committee, 588. 
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scrambling the jets and gathering personnel to arrive in the Korean theater within a 
specified amount of time, while logisticians on the peninsula practice doing everything 
necessary to receive and support the unit upon its arrival.   
In contrast, because the 14 individual UNC Sending States do not have standing 
commitments specifying which forces and how many personnel they would send to 
defend the ROK or support a humanitarian crisis, logistical planning is problematic.  The 
Sending States' decisions would be made when a crisis is brewing at the very earliest, or 
as late as months down the road after a conflict breaks out.   
Twice a year, the operational plan is exercised and U.S. forces' reception, staging, 
onward movement, and integration (RSOI) are rehearsed.  If the UNC Sending States’ 
assets are not spelled out in a plan, only limited RSOI processes can be exercised.  These 
processes include procedures for requesting specific capabilities and forces from the 
UNC Sending States and accepting what the UNC Sending States offer of their own 
volition.  Should a crisis break out, a Sending State’s offer would depend on its available 
resources and global commitments.  Once an offer is made, ROK and U.S. senior 
officials would confer with the Sending State National Command Element to decide 
whether to accept it and how to employ the resources.  On the other hand, ROK and U.S. 
militaries might request assistance from a Sending State to fill a specific need. The 
acceptance and offers procedure of UNC Sending State assets is very much a political 
and economic process that creates situations where logisticians and support functions 
have to react to the decisions made above them. 
In the twice-yearly exercises, lack of information on likely resources from UNC 
Sending States limits preplanning and makes it difficult to specify how units will 
progress through RSOI.  Furthermore, a host of additional questions plague the planning 
process, including concerns about compatibility of equipment, supplies, communications, 
personnel and procedures. The more knowledge of the Sending State’s capabilities and 
support requirements, the easier it is to plan. The longer it takes for such questions to be 
answered, the more likely that challenges to logistical support will compromise the 
mission.    
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C.  MEETING THE CHALLENGES: HUMANITARIAN EXERCISES AS A 
SOLUTION TO INFORMATION AND LOGISTICS PLANNING 
PROBLEMS  
 General Dwight D. Eisenhower said, “You will not find it difficult to prove that 
battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of 
logistics.”53  A sudden change scenario and the subsequent humanitarian crisis would 
present an unparalleled logistical challenge.  As Robert Kaplan observes, in such a 
situation, the United States would “lead an unwieldy regional coalition that would need to 
deploy rapidly in order to stabilize the North and deliver humanitarian assistance.”54 The 
coalition's unwieldiness results from the challenge of coordinating ROK and U.S. forces, 
as well as the difficulty of integrating forces and support from the 14 UNC Sending 
States.   
Suggested elements of joint phasing presented in a model consists of six phases:  
Phase 0, Shaping; Phase 1, Deterrence; Phase 2, Seize the Initiative; Phase 3, Dominate, 
Phase 4, Stabilization and Reconstruction; and Phase 5, Enable Civil Authority.55 A 
refugee crisis would require responses focused at Phases 4 and 5, stabilization and 
reconstruction and support for civil authority.  
At the present time, the two annual exercises on the Korean peninsula focus 
almost exclusively on wartime defense of South Korea, with little effort expended on 
dealing with refugees.  The closest scenario exercise is a noncombatant evacuation 
operation (NEO) that simulates evacuation of approximately 123,000 noncombatants 
from the Korean peninsula.56 However, after evacuation of noncombatants from the 
peninsula during a NEO, responsibility for their care no longer rests with the 
UNC/CFC/USFK.  Potential refugee scenarios might involve similar numbers of people, 
but would be accompanied by many more complexities.  As described above, the mass 
                                                 
53 Logistics Quotations website, http://www.logisticsworld.com/logistics/quotations.htm, accessed 4 
February 2009. 
54 Kaplan. 
55 See Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, D.C.:  Joint Staff, 26 December 
2006), IV-35 through IV-37. 
56 Author interview with USFK Current Operations section NEO Officer, Seoul, 13 November 2008. 
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migration of refugees on the peninsula would present tremendous short and long term 
challenges, especially if it occurs during war fighting.   
Although Maxwell notes that “planning for the defense of the ROK from attack 
by the North is the primary focus of UNC/CFC/ROK, and USFK military commands,” he 
also advises that it would be “prudent to examine other potential courses of action and at 
least prepare concept plans that can be finalized if and when indicators show that such 
other courses may come to fruition.”57   
In order to develop such plans, it is crucial to know the UNC Sending State force 
capabilities likely be contributed in such scenarios, as well as the accompanying 
logistical details necessary for sustainment support. The challenge is to overcome the 
information access limitation and its impact on logistics planning in order to better 
integrate UNC Sending States into Korean peninsula exercises.  The best solution is not 
to force integration into the war-fighting exercises, but rather to create a new annual 
exercise or replace one of the two war-fighting exercises with an exercise focused on 
Stabilization and Reconstruction (Phase 4) and related civil military operations.   
There are a number of advantages to pursuing such a shift in exercise scenarios.  
Exercising a humanitarian scenario relies less on sensitive information than exercising a 
war fighting scenario.  As noted above, international relationships determine how much 
information is shared. Dealing with a sensitive operational war plan increases the 
restrictions.  It does not make sense for UNC Sending States to spend time and resources 
participating in the UNC/CFC/USFK exercises if they are denied necessary information.  
The Sending States may agree to participate more fully in UNC/CFC/USFK humanitarian 
scenario exercises with fewer restrictions on information sharing.   
Furthermore, exercising a humanitarian scenario may more accurately mirror a 
real world situation, as it is likely that most UNC Sending State participation would occur 
during these later phases. In addition, operations in other theaters show that more 
countries choose to participate in Phase 4, Stabilization and Reconstruction, as such 
participation is politically less risky and more likely to gain domestic support.  For all of 
these reasons, UNC integration efforts seems most likely to succeed if focused less on 
                                                 
57 Maxwell, 2. 
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integration of the war fight and more on integration of subsequent operations to achieve 
stabilization, reconstruction and enabling civil authority. 
Overcoming information sharing restrictions by shifting focus to a humanitarian-
based exercise scenario offers an additional advantage, as it would allow the U.S. to take 
the logistics challenge head-on.  For the logisticians to do their job properly, agreements 
should be reached first, as these establish the legal and regulatory foundation for the use 
of monies and other resources.58  Some of the 14 UNC Sending States have agreements 
with the ROK government, and some with the United States, to receive logistical support 
while performing operations on the Korean peninsula. These agreements cover support 
ranging from feeding and clothing military forces to servicing ground, air, and naval 
assets and equipment.  Exercising these agreements to test their sufficiency and 
determine if updates or additions are required is critical to improving U.S. planning and 
assuring mission success.   
Towards this goal, UNC/CFC/USFK could enlist Pacific Command's (PACOM) 
Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) to create an exercise involving all 
UNC Sending States. The MPAT has conducted numerous humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief exercises, and has hosted participants from numerous Pacific Rim countries 
and island nations. Their mission statement describes MPAT as a “cooperative 
multinational effort to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment and/or 
augmentation of a multinational task force headquarters” that “provides responsive 
coalition/combined expertise in crisis action planning.”59 
An operational concept with a general indication of estimated capabilities and 
timelines can be developed without precommitting forces.  Sharing information on 
matters such as equipment interoperability, medical capabilities, force and equipment 
capabilities and best practices would help integrate the RSOI of UNC Sending State 
forces into the operations plan. As various factors would determine the type and amount  
 
                                                 
58 Examples are ACSAs (Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements) and MOAs (Memoranda of 
Agreement). 
59 U.S. Pacific Command, Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) website, 
http://www1.apan-info.net/Default.aspx?alias=www1.apan-info.net/mpat, accessed 1 November 2008.  
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of assets committed, firm commitment of actual forces must wait until they are needed.  
However, an operational plan for integrating the processes of likely participants can be 
prepared and codified in advance.  
Humanitarian-based scenarios also offer an opportunity to engage and develop 
relationships with a variety of governmental and nongovernmental organizations whose 
participation in a crisis would be crucial for successful resolution.  Exercising 
interagency relationships can maximize efficiencies in the event of crisis.  For example, 
the U.S. Department of State, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and the ROK 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and Unification (MOU) might all be 
involved and more easily integrated into a humanitarian refugee exercise scenario.  There 
would be much value added if information gleaned from such exercises were integrated 
into logistics and command processes.   
The activities of NGOs may impact security in the region because these groups 
have the potential to affect the North Korean regime.  In Paved with Good Intentions: 
The NGO Experience in North Korea, L. Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder examine 
interactions in North Korea between the North Korean government and NGOs from the 
United States, Europe, and South Korea.60  The NGO personnel have exposure to parts of 
North Korea kept inaccessible to the international media and the world community; their 
insight adds valuable perspective to the inner workings of the DPRK government.  As 
Victor Cha notes, since North Korea is an opaque state, much U.S. policy is based on 
assumptions.  Information from NGO experiences can help improve policy.  Furthermore, 
interagency coordination with NGOs and IGOs can bridge the gap between policy-
making and practical implementation, which would be useful for international 
community assistance in the reconstruction and stabilization of North Korea.   
Snyder and Scott found that the NGOs’ experiences in other countries did not 
prepare them for dealing with the DPRK regime in administering humanitarian aid.61  In 
a disaster response, NGO personnel generally encounter fragmented governmental 
structures.  In the DPRK, the government is intact and highly controlling, posing a great 
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impediment to NGO efforts at food distribution and other humanitarian aid.62  Likewise, 
the DPRK government was in a difficult position; they were heavily dependent on 
outside help for food assistance after the 1995 famine brought about by natural disasters, 
yet accepting help required opening up to outsiders and relinquishing a degree of control 
over their population.63    
In an attempt to maintain control, the DPRK government imposed strict controls 
on personnel allowed into the country.  For example, no Korean-speaking personnel were 
admitted, increasing the NGO’s reliance on government escorts. This presented 
additional constraints, since there were limited numbers of escorts available.64  Even with 
escorts, the NGOs were not allowed in certain parts of the country for military security 
reasons.65  As a result, it was difficult to monitor food distribution. (DPRK officials may 
have purposely impeded monitoring to facilitate hoarding by the elites). 
In addition to providing humanitarian aid, the intervention affected the 
perceptions of the DPRK technocrats entrusted to escort the NGO participants.  Their 
time with NGO personnel revealed the nature and the seriousness of their country's 
situation.  Flake and Snyder believe these technocrats can serve as catalysts for change. 
They might influence their government to move beyond food aid and tight control, accept 
developmental assistance and restructure the regime, eventually creating a more open 
society and contributing to the world community.66   
D. COALITION DEVELOPMENT 
Revising the annual exercises on the Korean peninsula to integrate refugee 
scenarios would affect the U.S. military stationed on the Korean Peninsula, Japan and 
elsewhere in the Pacific.67 The government of Japan allows use of UNC Rear bases 
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http://www.usfj.mil/Welcome_to_USFJ/Welcome_to_USFJ.html, accessed 4 January 2009. 
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throughout Japan for logistical support of the Korean theater.  A multinational coalition 
humanitarian scenario exercise might pave the way for Japan’s participation and 
contribute to a better working relationship between the ROK military and the Japan Self 
Defense Forces. 
The UNC coalition is sometimes identified as more valuable in presenting a 
unified international face to the North Koreans rather than as a force provider, but these 
functions are not mutually exclusive. Although UNC Sending States’ forces are small 
compared to U.S. forces, many have niche capabilities that could tip the balance in a 
crisis, especially if their capabilities are matched to gaps and shortfalls.  Encouraging 
greater integration by the Sending States, even in a restricted information sharing 
environment, might provide answers to numerous logistical questions useful in planning 
to maximize the use of these forces.   
Maxwell advises developing a contingency plan (CONPLAN) for non-conflict 
scenarios. Altering a command post exercise to include a focus on Phase 4 operations 
would facilitate spelling out how UNC Sending State forces would be integrated.  
Integration of UNC resources in the last three exercises has posed tremendous challenges 
due to information disclosure issues.  Based on other theater operations, if most UNC 
Sending State participation occurred in Phase 4 operations, there are ways to practice 
processes and develop relationships to maximize interoperability and efficiency among 
the ROK, the U.S., and the Sending State nations.  
With the current command structure, UNC forces would be led by the 4-star U.S. 
commander; this structure will remain after the OPCON transfer in 2012.  After the 
OPCON transfer, the U.S. will take a “supporting to supported” role. The ROK will 
control their own forces even in wartime, and U.S. forces, together with UNC forces, will 
provide support as needed.   
The UNC integration emphasis began in 2004, and the ROK military, focused on 
the 2012 OPCON transfer, has not fully engaged with the integration concept.  It would 
benefit the ROK to take more interest in UNC Sending State integration.  The Civil 
Military Operations Division (CMOD) is a growing, ROK-led organization in charge of 
civil military operations on the Korean peninsula.  As a developing organization, the 
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CMOD has the potential to coordinate UNC Sending State assets with its own 
organization and missions.  Although the CMOD is the coordinating agency with IGOs 
and NGOs, there is little day-to-day interface among the groups during armistice.  Given 
the reasonable assumption that UNC Sending States forces would be most heavily 
represented during Phase 4, and that IGOs and NGOs will also have a strong presence in 
this phase, it would behoove the ROK government to encourage their CMOD to interface 
with these agencies. 
 Representatives of the Naval, Air, Ground, and Special Operations components 
and staff agencies such as the Surgeon’s office and subsections of the logistics 
community have inquired during exercise planning conferences about the capabilities that 
would be provided by UNC Sending States in a conflict.  Because current conditions 
preclude Sending States from participating in exercise planning by restricting information 
dissemination, such questions remain unanswered. This leaves a planning gap at the 
operational level.  Should conflict break out, UNC Sending States will still be integrated, 
but without prior planning. Integration and interoperability coordination would be 
awkward, and subsequent logistic support would be at best a reaction-based, muddle-
through process, an afterthought rather than a well-planned out process.   Kaplan’s 
depiction of the United States as leading an “unwieldy regional coalition” would likely 
seem a vast understatement.   
Since information disclosure is the main limiting factor, the CFC should take the 
lead in creating a forum where the relevant agencies of the ROK, the United States, UNC 
Sending States, and various IGOs and NGOs can share information and develop 
cooperative relationships.  No OPLAN information would be required, and the results of 
this collaboration could be integrated into the OPLAN.  As relationships grow and trust is 
fostered, full integration into the exercises may become more likely.  
 MPAT was already mentioned as an avenue to this end.  For the ROK-led 
CMOD, the recommendation would be to embed U.S. civil affairs and foreign area 
officers into its organization, and consult with professionals of various other disciplines.  
Nowadays, the NGOs and faith-based organizations that have banded together to help 
North Korean refugees are organized and knowledgeable through field experience with 
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the North Korean population.  Specialists in health care, psychology, education and social 
work are studying the North Koreans and their ability to assimilate into South Korean and 
American society.  Along with demographic analyses, their knowledge might be 
indispensible in planning responses to sudden change scenarios involving North Korean 
refugees. As an added benefit, research from such collaboration might contribute to 
development of alternative U.S. policy approaches towards the North Korean nuclear 
issue. 
 This chapter addressed the responsibilities of the U.S., ROK, and coalition 
militaries should a refugee crisis emerge.  This chapter also addressed the potential 
magnitude of the North Korean refugee issue should no proactive actions be taken.  The 
following chapter switches focus from reactive to proactive.  It discusses each of the 
regional players who have a stake in the refugee issue and outlines the bilateral issues 
each has with North Korea that may inhibit it from addressing the issue.  That 
information is used to inform policy recommendations intended to preclude a refugee 
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III. THE NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE ISSUE AND THE SIX 
PARTY MEMBERS 
The North Korean refugee issue may not be in the forefront of any of the Six 
Party nations’ agendas, but if left unchecked, it has the potential to become a 
destabilizing humanitarian disaster.  Its impact in terms of human and economic costs 
might even surpass the 2004 Asian tsunami or 2005 Hurricane Katrina.  North Korea’s 
neighbors should not wish the refugee problem away, but should be proactive and 
implement policy to mitigate its potential to become an unmanageable problem. 
To lay the groundwork for policy recommendations in Chapter IV, this chapter 
begins by reviewing each country’s historical relationship with North Korea.  Because 
international relations influence the perceptions of each receiving population toward 
North Koreans who may want to immigrate, the historical background provides insight to 
factors that may hinder a country’s desire to address this issue, providing the perspective 
necessary for developing sound policy.  
The Korean diaspora constitutes an important subpopulation of each country.  The 
United States, China, and Japan together represent 80 percent of the overseas Korean 
population.68  Details on the nature of the Korean populations in China, Japan, Russia, 
and the United States can suggest the type of policy each country might most profitably 
develop. These Korean diasporas are potential conduits between the receiving 
populations and new North Korean settlers, and their characteristics may hinder or assist 
refugee assimilation.  The discussion of South Korea centers on North Koreans who have 
already immigrated and the problems associated with their integration into South Korean 
society.  
 
                                                 
68 The next largest concentrations are in the Commonwealth of Independent States, in which 
Uzbekistan has the highest number, followed by Russia, and in Canada.  Inbom Choi, “Korean Diaspora in 
the Making:  Its Current Status and Impact on the Korean Economy” in C. Bergsten and Inbom Choi, 
editors, The Korean Diaspora in the World Economy (Washington, D.C.:  Institute for International 
Economics, 2003), 17–18. 
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National policies will influence North Korean immigrants' ability to assimilate 
and succeed in their new environments.  South Koreans living abroad had a significant 
impact on the economic development of their home country, and the success of North 
Koreans abroad could have a similar impact on North Korean development.69  If the Six 
Party nations work together to resolve the refugee issue, they can develop a solution that 
both eases the suffering of the refugees and has a positive effect on the rest of the North 
Korean people.  A solution might encourage North Korea to become a more open society, 
and a more open society is more transparent. Greater transparency, in turn, might help 
resolve the bilateral issues between North Korea and each of the individual countries, 
including the nuclear issue. 
For example, if each country were to create a guest worker program that legalized 
North Korean immigration and employment, not only could North Koreans have a legal 
outlet to work and support their families, but countries like Japan and Russia could 
alleviate their worker shortage problems, and China's borders would become more 
secure. Indeed, such measures might lead to greater overall security in the Northeast 
Asian region.  Awareness of potential short and long term problems likely to emerge 
from the refugee issue is critical for developing policies and programs to alleviate the 
situation.  The challenge is to formulate policy acceptable to all of the Six Party nations.   
A. NATIONAL AGENDAS OF THE SIX PARTY MEMBERS  
Each Six Party nation has its own issues and concerns with North Korea that 
influence each country's incentives in dealing with the refugee issue.  For China, the 
numbers of refugees flowing across their shared border is an unwanted distraction.  Any 
event triggering a mass exodus threatens regional stability and would be a major detractor 
to China’s current focus on economic and military growth.  North Korea has a large 
monetary debt to Russia, which it is paying off by sending labor forces to work in the 
timber industry in the Russian Far East (RFE) region, where Russians themselves are 
                                                 
69 Choi describes how the Korean diasporas abroad affected the development of the Korean economy 
through trade and investment, funds transfers, and the labor market.  Inbom Choi, “Korean Diaspora in the 
Making:  Its Current Status and Impact on the Korean Economy” in C. Bergsten and Inbom Choi, editors, 
The Korean Diaspora in the World Economy (Washington, D.C.:  Institute for International Economics, 
2003), 17–27. 
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unwilling to work and live.  South Korea is concerned with the economic and social 
ramifications of reunification, while Japan wants to resolve the abduction of its citizens 
before moving onto any other issues, including the nuclear issue.  The United States’ 
main efforts on North Korean issues focus on the nuclear issue rather than the 
humanitarian needs of refugees.  If the Six Party nations were to collaborate and develop 
policy to address the refugee issue, this policy might alleviate or resolve many such 
bilateral issues. 
B. NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES AND CHINA 
Of all the Six Party nations, China holds the key to the fate of the North Korean 
refugees.  The 868-mile shared border, and the large ethnic Korean population living 
across the Tumen River in the Yanbian Autonomous Region, facilitate North Koreans' 
escape and provide a place for them to hide.70  Chinese authorities are unwilling to 
sanction asylum, and despite condemnation from the international community for human 
rights violations, they frequently return captured refugees to face a dismal fate in North 
Korea.  To China, international disapprobation is the lesser of the two evils, especially 
when the alternative is collapse of the North Korean regime followed by a mass exodus 
of refugees into their territory. 
1. History of Relations between North Korea and China 
Historically, China has very strong cultural ties to the whole of the Korean 
peninsula.  Ideologically and economically, China has been a staunch supporter of North 
Korea, especially when it came to North Korea’s aid during the Korean War.  However, a 
relationship once described as “close as lips to teeth” has become distant and pragmatic.  
The year 1992, when China normalized relations with South Korea, marked the turning 
point in the relationship. The deteriorating relationship was further degraded with North 
                                                 
70 According to Si Joong Kim, approximately two million ethnic Koreans live in China, which is about 
40 percent of all overseas Koreans.  In China, the largest concentration of ethnic Koreans lives in Yanbian.  
Si Joong Kim, “The Economic Status and Role of Ethnic Koreans in China” in C. Bergsten and Inbom 
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Korea's nuclear test in 2006.71  The past and present value of North Korea for China has 
been to serve as a buffer zone between China and democratic South Korea with its large 
U.S. presence. 
As it stands now, China wants to focus on developing its economy.  North Korean 
relations with China might improve if it were to follow suit under Chinese tutelage.  
China is interested in maintaining a stable North Korea and North Korean regime, as it 
wants to maintain its buffer zone and is not ready to absorb a mass exodus of refugees 
should the regime or state of North Korea fail. 
2. The Korean Diaspora in China 
The second largest population of Koreans outside the peninsula is concentrated in 
China.72  Many ethnic Koreans migrated to China between 1850 and 1945, propelled by a 
variety of motives, including escape from the famine in Korea and the Japanese 
occupation.73  Within China, the majority of ethnic Koreans are concentrated in Yanbian, 
a section in Jilin province (also known as the Korean Autonomous Region) where PRC 
minority policy grants ethnic Koreans regional autonomy.74  This clustering of ethnic 
Koreans has allowed them to maintain much of their cultural heritage and language.  
Many signs throughout the city of Yangi are written in both Hangul and Chinese, and it is 
not uncommon to come across bilingual Hangul and Mandarin speakers. 
Because Yanbian is geographically contiguous with North Korea and because of 
the PRC’s isolation from South Korea prior to normalization of relations, the ethnic 
Koreans in this region are culturally closer to the North Koreans than the South Koreans.  
However, due to strengthened Chinese–South Korean relations, increasing numbers of 
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South Koreans immigrate or travel to northeast China for business purposes.  As the 
influx of South Korean businesses increases the need for Chinese networks and language, 
ethnic Korean–Chinese have been drawn to these locations.75  
Because of geographic accessibility, North Korean refugees turn to the ethnic 
Koreans in China for help in defecting.  Bribing the North Korean guards, they make 
their way across the Tumen River into China to find food or a way to make money to take 
back to their families.  Korean–Chinese are willing to help the refugees for several 
reasons.  Familial ties tend to make ethnic Koreans in China more sympathetic than their 
counterparts in other countries.  Furthermore, during the famine in China in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, many ethnic Koreans crossed from China into North Korea to 
find food.76  Now that the flow is reversed, this shared history, combined with their 
Korean identity, gives many Korean–Chinese a sense of kinship, allowing them to 
identify and sympathize with the North Koreans' plight.   
3. Obstacles to Addressing the Refugee Issue for China 
 Because it fears a flood of refugees, the Chinese government routinely repatriates 
North Koreans despite condemnation from the international community, justifying their 
return under an agreement between China and North Korea.  China’s stance is that North 
Korean repatriation is a bilateral issue, and North Korea has sovereignty over its people. 
 What China does not want is a unified Korea with strong ties to the United States 
on its border.  If a unified Korea would maintain close ties to the United States, China has 
less incentive to address the refugee issue if doing so might contribute to Korean 
unification.  However, if China believed that a unified Korea would be more influenced 
by and have closer diplomatic ties to China, it would more likely address the refugee 
issue.    
It is interesting to note that China forms relations through economic projects with 
numerous smaller powers in South America and Africa, yet neglects to form such 
relations with North Korea.  Although North Korea may not be as rich in resources as the 
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other countries China seek ties with, its geographical location is advantageous.  Should 
North Korea reform economically, open itself to the global community, and support a 
major economic project like the Iron Silk Road, China would be a major regional 
beneficiary.77  China has attempted to coax North Korea to reform economically, without 
success.  Chinese influence might be strengthened if they addressed the refugee issue. 
Suzanne Scholte sums it up succinctly in an editorial in the Korea Times: 
The Chinese Government and even U.S. policy makers have an unfounded 
fear that if China showed compassion to the refugees, this could cause de-
stabilization:  they fear China would be flooded with refugees and this 
could lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime.  This fear is not 
only unfounded, but is prolonging the suffering of the North Korean 
refugee.  This refugee situation is unlike any in the world as the refugees 
have a place to go—South Korea and other countries!  Furthermore, 
refugees are leaving North Korea mostly because of famine-like 
conditions and most want to go back—even those who have resettled in 
South Korea want to go back to North Korea once Kim Jong-il is gone or 
reforms are enacted.  If fleeing refugees could lead to the collapse of the 
regime, it would have happened by now.  After 500,000 crossed the border 
and 3 million people died, Kim Jong-il’s grip on power never faltered.  By 
abiding instead by its international treaty obligations and allowing 
refugees safe passage to South Korea this would instead be a means to 
subtly pressure Kim Jong-il and his regime to reform, something that is 
also in China’s best interest.  When reform comes to North Korea, 
conditions will improve and China will no longer have to deal with this 
refugee problem, because North Koreans will not need to flee—so China 
is prolonging this refugee problem by their policy.78  
Should China change its stance on the North Korean refugee issue and help 
facilitate refugees’ gradual assimilation in its own country, as well as other countries, it 
could be the first step to prevent the scenario China fears the most—a sudden flow of 
refugees crossing its shared border with North Korea.  Furthermore, once North Korea  
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sees that it cannot do anything about the international community’s gradual absorption of 
its citizens, it could eventually be coerced into becoming a more open society and more 
open to economic reforms.  
C. NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES AND JAPAN 
There is not much literature on the North Korean refugee issue and its 
implications for relations between Japan and the Korean peninsula.  This may be because 
so few North Korean refugees have resettled in Japan in comparison with the number in 
South Korea. However, an uncontrolled sudden change scenario with a mass exodus 
might overwhelm Japan with boat refugees.79 
This section fills the gap in the literature by examining the implications of the 
North Korean refugee situation in the context of historical relations between Japan and 
the two Koreas, illustrating how the refugee situation continues to influence the 
relationships between Japan and the two Koreas.  Japan might work towards healing its 
damaged relationships with its neighbors by addressing the refugee issue.  If Japan were 
to focus its resources and military capabilities on humanitarian-based missions, and the 
region were to become more secure and prosperous as a result, inter-regional relations 
would improve.  Japanese government policy on this issue might help or hinder its 
relations with the two Koreas and with others in the region. 
1. History of Relations between North Korea and Japan  
Of all the relationships between countries in Northeast Asia, none face so many 
obstacles as those involving Japan and the two Korean governments.  After fighting the 
Chinese in 1894–95 and the Russians in 1904–5, the Japanese gained control of the 
Korean Peninsula.  A Japanese protectorate from 1905, Korea endured many hardships, 
especially during the Japanese occupation (1910 to 1945).  Relations between Japan and 
South Korea have improved immensely in the past half-century, while those between 
Japan and North Korea remain frustrating.  The bitter history of the occupation created so 
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much enmity that friendly relations between a unified Korea and Japan seem 
unattainable.  Numerous disagreements stem from the governments’ inability to agree on 
what happened in their shared history and lead to disputes over school textbook contents. 
Despite these differences, Japan and South Korea have improved relations since 
the colonial period, with the greatest gain for South Korea occurring during Park Chung 
Hee’s presidency (1963–1979).  Unlike his predecessors Rhee Syngman and Yun Bo-
seon, Park Chung Hee embraced Japan as a nation to emulate in its infrastructure, 
government structure, bureaucracy, and economic and technical development.  Although 
he is remembered most for his dictatorial leadership style, Park is also the president given 
the most credit for South Korea’s near-miraculous economic growth.80  Park's 
accomplishments required opening his mind to see Japan as a model, but Koreans in 
general are unwilling to acknowledge this, particularly when their attention is focused on 
Japanese atrocities during the occupation.  Unresolved issues revolving around territorial 
disputes, "comfort women" (sexual slavery), and school textbooks fuel the continued 
bitter relationship between Japan and Korea.  Interestingly, Korean and Japanese youth 
pop culture is a common interest connecting the two cultures, but much more is required 
to overcome the rancor of the past and establish a conciliatory relationship.  
2. The Korean Diaspora in Japan 
Japanese–Korean relations are strongly shaped by the history of how the Korean 
diaspora came to Japan, the development of its “civil rights” in subsequent decades, and 
the impact of Japanese–Korean relations on Japanese policies toward domestic Koreans.  
A historical perspective explains why the Koreans living in Japan overwhelmingly 
support North Korea.   
During the Japanese occupation, Koreans were imported as forced labor in Japan.  
Later, while some remained in Japan, many were repatriated to North Korea.  Ethnic 
Japanese wives accompanied their ethnic Korean husbands repatriated to North Korea  
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and have since not been allowed to return to Japan.  North Korea’s refusal to allow the 
Japanese women to return home is among the North Korean human rights violations 
identified in Japanese draft legislation. 
Collectively, Koreans in Japan constitute the largest ethnic minority.  They run 
over half of the pachinko parlors, which make gambling a large source of revenue for 
remittances sent to relatives in North Korea.81  There are two groups within the Korean 
community in Japan: the “Mindan,” with close ties with the South Korean government, 
and the “Chongryun,” aligned with the North Korean government.  The Chongryun run 
most of Japan's Korean schools, offering education ranging from elementary school to 
university level.82  Korean immigrants wanting a Korean education for their children 
ended up supporting this pro-North Korean group.  Right after the Korean War, many 
Japanese–Koreans did not support the Mindan because South Korean military 
governments and their close relations with the United States were unpopular.83   
Discrimination is yet another obstacle to Japanese–Korean relations.84  Koreans 
face discrimination in Japan when applying for jobs, in personal relationships and in 
many other social situations.  On a social level, Koreans who live in Japan frequently 
adopt Japanese names and hide their Korean heritage in an attempt to assimilate.  It is one 
thing to maintain one’s own identity and take on the qualities prescribed by another 
society in order to assimilate; it is another to have to completely deny one’s own heritage 
to be accepted.  For example, in Japan, it is considered a test of true love for a Japanese 
person to stay in a romantic relationship after learning that his or her love interest is 
actually ethnically Korean.85   
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At an institutional level, Koreans living in Japan have been subject to a variety of 
foreigner registration systems. The original system required carrying fingerprint 
identification cards.  With the evolution of Japanese immigration laws, requirements for 
some Koreans on special permanent resident status were loosened, while those in other 
categories continue to be required to carry special identity cards.86  Though it is illegal to 
ask whether someone is Korean or not, places like private clubs circumvent this rule by 
requiring new members to show their koseki, a family registration card.87  Thus, despite 
laws to eradicate discrimination, a more subtle form of discrimination towards non-
Japanese has emerged. 
It is ironic that Japan’s discriminatory policies toward its Korean population seem 
to undermine its position at a time when Japan wants to forge stronger economic relations 
with South Korea.  Because of the pressure to assimilate totally, “the loss of Korean 
language among Koreans in Japan alienates them from contemporary Korean society and 
deprives these individuals as well as Japanese society of a chance to bridge Japanese and 
Korean societies.”88 
3. Obstacles to Addressing the Refugee Issue for Japan 
Memories of the Japanese occupation are not the only obstacle to better relations 
between Japan and North and South Korea.  A major issue between Japan and North 
Korea is the August 1998 launching of the 1500 km range Taepodong 1 missile, which 
flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean.  In response, the Japan Air Self-Defense 
Force deployed E-2Cs early warning aircraft and other aircraft, and the Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force dispatched P-3Cs maritime patrol aircraft and vessels to the Sea of 
Japan to gather information.  The Defense Agency conducted a search for debris but none 
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was found.89  North Korea claimed that the Taepodong 1 was a satellite launched into 
space.  North Korea repeated this act in April 2009.  Japan, South Korea and the United 
States pressed for a UN statement condemning North Korea’s action, but lacked the 
support from China and Russia.90 
A multitude of other issues dating back to the Japanese occupation impede 
improved relations.  Koreans have bitter memories of Japanese exploiting Korean women 
as “comfort women” for Japanese soldiers and trying to obliterate Korean culture and 
language by forcing Koreans to take Japanese names and forbidding them to use the  
Korean language.  Furthermore, Japan and Korea have disagreements over fishing zones 
in international waters and territorial disputes over an island which the Koreans call 
Tokdo and the Japanese call Takeshima. 
Perhaps most contentious is the abduction issue, an emotionally heated topic for 
the Japanese public.91 In a summit meeting with Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi on September 17, 2002, Kim Jong Il confessed to the abductions of 13 Japanese 
citizens during the 1970s and 1980s to train North Korean spies in Japanese language and 
culture.  He claimed the abductions took place without his knowledge or approval, 
apologetically assured Koizumi that those responsible had been punished, and promised it 
would not happen again.92  When Koizumi asked for the return of the abductees, the 
North Koreans alleged that eight of the thirteen had died of various causes; the remaining 
five were repatriated.   
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The exact number of abductees is still in question, as mysterious circumstances 
surround the disappearance of other Japanese citizens.  Japanese officials speculate that 
more than 13 were abducted.  The deaths of the eight who allegedly passed away are 
suspect and not yet verified. The remains of one of the alleged abductees were returned to 
Japan, but Japanese officials claim that DNA testing proved them to be from an older 
woman.  Even this evidence is controversial, as disinterested third parties suggest that 
contamination of the remains could produce false results.  The North Korean Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs repeatedly states that the abduction issue has been resolved.  
According to Samuel Kim, the abduction issue “dominate[s] Japanese policy 
toward North Korea, to the exclusion of all else.”93 Because of the strong bilateral ties 
between Japan and the United States, the issue is on the Six Party talk’s agenda for North 
Korea and must be addressed if they are to receive aid and cooperation from Japan.  The 
Japanese government claims that the abduction issue is an important concern for Japan’s 
sovereignty and the lives and safety of Japanese citizens.94  Although Japan understands 
that the Six Party talks may not be the proper forum to resolve the issue, it has become a 
matter of national pride; its citizens will not overlook it and the Japanese government 
cannot dismiss it.95   
The abductions make Japanese feel like victims of North Korea. Conversely, a 
number of issues make Koreans feel they were victims of Japan.  If Japan will not 
address the refugee issue until these questions of national pride are resolved, the delay 
may be at the expense of its own security.  If the other concerns are laid aside, Japan’s 
involvement in the refugee issue may give impetus to resolving the remaining issues. 
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In Alignment Despite Antagonism, Victor Cha analyses the trilateral relationship 
between Japan, Korea, and the United States, characterizing the United States as the 
mediator between Japan and Korea.96  Although U.S.–Japan relations are strong, they can 
still be challenged by events on the Korean peninsula. When Kim Jong Il confessed to the 
abduction of Japanese citizens, the issue could have divided Japan and the United States 
had the U.S. not honored its alliance and supported Japan's inclusion of the issue as a Six-
Party talk agenda item.  Through military trilateral meetings, the United States continues 
to try to develop and facilitate working relationships between Japan and Korea.  
D. NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES AND RUSSIA  
The border between Russia and North Korea is shorter than China's border with 
North Korea. The Russian national government is more tolerant than the Chinese 
government insofar as they do not necessarily subscribe to repatriating asylum-seeking 
North Koreans and provide more protective rights for the North Korean timber industry 
workers in the RFE. Oftentimes, though, local Russian officials are not aware of the 
workers' rights, and cooperate with the North Korean handlers to prevent defections.97 
1. History of Relations between North Korea and Russia 
The beginning of the Soviet–North Korea relationship in 1948 was ideologically 
based and driven by North Korea’s geostrategic importance to the Soviets.98  In 1961, a 
mutual defense agreement, “The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance,” was created. In the mid-1980s, the Soviets were the main source of North 
Korea’s military acquisitions.  In the latter part of the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
leadership brought about a dramatic change in Soviet relations between the two Koreas, 
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shifting the balance of allegiance away from North Korea in a move to normalize 
relations with Seoul.  Moscow continued to fortify Pyongyang with military equipment 
until the early 1990s.99 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia, under Boris Yeltsin’s 
leadership, moved even closer to Seoul.  In November 1992, he told South Korea’s 
National Assembly  that Russia was "turning from looking toward the West, Europe and 
the United States, to the Asia–Pacific region," calling South Korea "one of Russia’s 
leading partners in the region.”100  An outcome of the meeting in Seoul was to start 
combined naval exercises. Russia even sent its military attaché in Seoul to observe the 
1993 UNC/CFC/USFK annual exercise (at the time, called Team Spirit).  The two major 
joint exercises in South Korea are always met by protests from North Korean media.101 
Russia’s shift to enhance relations with South Korea naturally degraded its 
relations with North Korea.  As naval cooperation grew between South Korea and Russia, 
the North Korean–Russian naval relationship was minimized.  Joint naval exercises 
between North Korea and Russia were eliminated and only military exchanges 
continued.102  Overall military sales from Russia to North Korea dropped dramatically 
due to North Korea’s inability to pay cash.103   
The 1961 treaty expired in 1996, and Yeltsin informed ROK President Kim that 
they would not renew the treaty with North Korea.  In 2000, the 1961 treaty was replaced 
by the “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between Russia and 
the DPRK,” signed by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Il.  Noticeably absent in this treaty 
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any Russian leader, demonstrated his desire to normalize relations with North Korea as 
part of a cooperative, trilateral relationship with South Korea, directed towards economic 
development in the Northeast Asia region.104   
Though Russia has always had a stake in Northeast Asian regional stability, 
interest in the region increased when accession of land from China via the 1860 First 
Treaty of Peking expanded Russian territory, bringing the refugee issue to their border. 
2. The Korean Diaspora in Russia  
The prominence of ethnic Koreans in RFE goes back to the 1860s, especially 
along the Russian–North Korean border.  Fearing that ethnic Koreans who had lived 
under Japanese colonial rule would exert unwanted Japanese influence in the RFE, in the 
1930s, Stalin forced about 172,000 ethnic Koreans to relocate to Central Asian republics 
such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.105  In the 1990s, Gorbachev allowed those forcibly 
moved to return to the RFE, providing homes and farmland as restitution.106 
 The Korean diaspora in Russia is the most diverse of all the Six Party nations.  In 
a study on ethnic Koreans in Russia, Jeanyoung Lee identifies nine different 
subgroups.107  Three Korean–Russian groups, referred to as “Koryoin,” are “heavily 
russified [sic] in culture” and do not speak the Korean language.  The first Korean–
Russian group consists of those from the Stalin era who were not forced to move; the 
second group includes ethnic Koreans who arrived from the Sakhalin Islands having been 
forced there for labor by the Japanese right after World War II, and the third group is 
made up of immigrants from the Central Asian republics during the Soviet Republic era.  
One North Korean group includes North Koreans who work in the timber industry in the 
RFE; another is composed of North Korean refugees.  Two Korean–Chinese groups 
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(“Chosonjok”) are characterized by Lee as “market traders” and “shuttle traders.”  The 
two South Korean groups include businessmen and students, and missionaries, many of 
whom carry foreign passports, including U.S. passports.   
The groups vary in Korean language usage and Korean culture, with the Korean–
Chinese and those from the Sakhalins most fluent in the Korean language.  The Korean 
diaspora in Russia differs from those in Japan and China; they are more diverse and less 
likely to retain their Korean heritage.  These factors could directly impact each group’s 
ability to absorb North Korean refugees or provide an environment conducive for North 
Korean refugee assimilation. 
3. Obstacles to Addressing the Refugee Issue for Russia 
Compared with other Six Party members, Russia has fewer disincentives to 
address the North Korean refugee issue.  Russia is preoccupied with domestic internal 
stability and pays little attention to the North Korean refugee issue.  Although refugees 
escape through the North Korean–Russian border, their numbers do not compare with 
those who cross the Chinese border.  On the international front, Russia is more wary of 
relations with China than they are concerned with a potential refugee situation in the 
RFE.   
 However, if North Korea were to open up and the refugee issue be resolved, 
Russia stands to gain economically should the dream of the Iron Silk Road be realized.  
Kang says that the Iron Silk Road's “potential upsides are massive, in the long run” and 
the project would benefit China, South Korea and Japan as well as Russia.108 
E.  NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES AND THE UNITED STATES 
Despite the 2004 passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA), 
which allows North Koreans to resettle in the United States, as of March 2008, only 43 
refugees were accepted into the U.S.109  Some question why a North Korean refugee would 
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relocate to the United States rather than South Korea.  A Japanese NGO, Life Funds for 
North Korean Refugees (LFNKR), notes that many refugees have relatives in the Korean 
communities in the United States.  Furthermore, some refugees fear North Korean agents will 
harm them if they resettled in South Korea.110  According to a 2005 State Department report, 
the United States is working with the South Korean government to share information for 
background checks on North Koreans who want to settle in the United States.111   
1. History of Relations between the United States and North Korea 
Although the history of relations between North Korea and the United States do 
not go back as far as North Korea’s relations with other nations, the last 58 years have 
been fraught with tumultuous events for U.S.–DPRK relations.  Since the United States 
led the United Nations Command against North Korea during the Korean war, North 
Korea has retaliated against the U.S. and the international community by capturing the 
USS Pueblo and its crew, shooting down a U.S. reconnaissance plane, axing two U.S. 
officers to death at Panmunjom, firing a couple of missiles, and reneging on the nuclear 
proliferation treaty.  In turn, the United States labeled North Korea as part of the “axis of 
evil” and an “outpost of tyranny.”112   
2. The Korean Diaspora in the United States 
Most overseas Koreans live in the United States and are concentrated (in 
descending order) in the cities of Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, 
Seattle, Houston, and Washington, D.C.113  Marcus Noland describes three waves of 
Korean immigration. The first wave consists of the Koreans who arrived in Hawaii in the 
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early 1900s to work the sugarcane fields.  The second wave includes students arriving 
during the decade after the Korean War, and the third wave occurred in the mid-1960s 
with changes in the United States immigration quota system.114  As an ethnic minority in 
the United States, Koreans are an immigration success story, with a higher than average 
percentage running successful small businesses and obtaining higher education.115    
Noland credits the third wave Korean immigrants as major contributors to their 
local economies throughout the United States.116  Soogil Young notes that the U.S. 
educational system allowed Koreans to obtain PhD level educations.  The “brainpower” 
of Koreans educated abroad contributes to South Korea’s economic development, which 
also benefits the United States through trade relations.117 
3. Obstacles to Addressing the Refugee Issue for the United States 
The overriding issue between the United States and North Korea that competes 
for U.S. interest in the refugee problem is North Korea’s development and proliferation 
of nuclear weapons.  The two nations' patterns of negotiations on nuclear issues have 
hindered the United States' ability to address humanitarian issues productively with North 
Korea.  This is because trust and transparency cannot be established between the two 
countries. 
Since 2003, the United States has led the Six Party talks in a back-and-forth dance 
to convince North Korea to stand down their nuclear program.  George Perkovich, 
director of the Carnegie Nonproliferation Program, calls North Korea’s implosion of the 
Yongbyon tower in June 2008 a positive step.  He emphasizes that denuclearization is a 
“step-by-step” process agreed to by the members of the Six Party Talks.118  In his view, 
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the focus should be not be fixated on the desired end state, but on the fact that the North 
Koreans are “moving in the right direction.”119  According to Perkovich, North Korea, 
motivated by the desire to feel secure that the U.S. will not isolate and invade the 
country, wants fully normalized relations with the United States.  Interestingly, Perkovich 
is skeptical that denuclearization will be achieved, not for want of North Korean actions, 
but because he doubts that the U.S. will keep its part of the bargain in a step-for-step 
process.120  
Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at New 
York’s Social Science Research Council, outlines the events that led to the United States’ 
failure to uphold its end of the 1994 Agreed Framework.  In the agreement, North Korea 
committed to freezing and dismantling its nuclear program in exchange for two light 
water reactors (LWRs) and 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.  In addition, Washington was 
to “move towards full normalization of political and economic relations.”121 But 
Washington failed to deliver the heavy fuel oil on schedule.122 According to Sigal, 
domestic U.S. politics further delayed funding for the LWRs when Republicans took over 
Congress shortly after the signing of the Agreed Framework.  Because the Republicans 
disagreed with President Bill Clinton’s policies, the Clinton administration “back-
pedaled” and did not push for the funding.  To make matters worse, Seoul was reluctant 
to carry out its terms in the Agreed Framework during President Kim Young Sam’s 
administration, and hoped that a North Korean collapse would obviate the need for the 
ROK to support the U.S. in carrying out its promises. Contrary to the ROK’s 
expectations, North Korea did not collapse. Discouraged by the other countries' failure to 
deliver, North Koreans resumed their nuclear program. 
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All Six Party nations have a vested interest in Northeast Asia, but the nuclear 
issue is not the only threat to regional stability. A collective solution to the refugee crisis 
might have a positive influence in opening North Korea to engage more fully with the 
global community, which would help to the nuclear issue and considerably strengthen the 
region’s economy.   
F. NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
The ROK has the greatest responsibility in absorbing and helping North Korean 
refugees, as South Korea is most refugees' final destination.  The administrations of Kim 
Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun advocated the Sunshine Policy, and Peace and Prosperity 
Policy, respectively, whereas the current Lee Myung Pak administration is transitioning 
to a more hard-line approach with North Korea and its nuclear issues.123  Although 
attitudes and government policies towards the refugees change with administrations, the 
social concerns of North Korean resettlement in South Korea persist, especially with 
increases in the numbers of refugees settling in South Korea. 
1. The Changing Demographics of Defectors 
A variety of social issues stem from the 13,000 plus North Korean refugees who 
have settled in South Korea over the last 19 years.  Although the social dynamics of 
North Koreans assimilating into South Korea differ from their assimilation experiences 
elsewhere, the lessons learned from North Korean resettlement in South Korea can be 
applied to other countries. This section discusses South Korean government policy to 
facilitate refugee resettlement and its effect on the South Korean population’s perception 
of the North Koreans in their midst.124  
The demographics of defectors and policies addressing them have evolved over 
time.  In the past, the South Korean government recognized defectors as “heroes” and 
awarded large amounts of cash, usually commensurate with the value of the intelligence 
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provided by each person.  In May 1996, a North Korean pilot reportedly received 
$320,000 for landing his MIG-19 fighter jet on South Korean soil.125  Perhaps these 
defectors left North Korea for ideological or political reasons.  However, the famines of 
the mid-1990s drove thousands of hungry North Koreans away for economic reasons.  
When the number of defectors increased substantially, the South Korean government had 
to mass-process the refugees.  A transition facility called Hanawon was set up, and 
policies adopted to integrate the growing number of defectors into South Korean 
society.126  However, the Hanawon was soon filled to capacity and the three month 
training period was shortened to two months to accommodate the influx.   
2. Strangers in the Homeland:  Social Issues of North Korean Refugees 
in South Korea 
When refugees resettle in South Korea, they are debriefed, interviewed, and given 
government-sponsored classes designed to aid their assimilation into South Korean 
society.  They receive a monetary settlement to get them started in their own apartment, 
and an allowance to live on while looking for employment.  
One might imagine that North Koreans, ecstatic to leave dictatorship and poverty 
to live in the prosperous, democratic half of the peninsula, would have few problems 
assimilating into the South. This is not necessarily the case. Korea has a tradition of 
regionalism. More than fifty years of division has essentially created separate cultures in 
North and South Korea, and the North Korean refugees in South Korea exemplify the 
dichotomy.  There are accounts of the North Koreans unable to get and keep jobs because 
of discriminatory hiring practices or the immigrants' lack of familiarity with South 
Korean work culture.  Many cannot find employment outside the “3D” category: dirty, 
dangerous, and demeaning. 
In “The Lost Generation,” Christina Shim states,  
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The socialization of the North Korean system and the loss of the refugees’ 
entire worldview and personal identity upon immigration are so traumatic 
that integrating into another society becomes impossible for the majority 
of them.127   
For many, integration into South Korean society is especially difficult because of 
the disappointment in discovering that integration is not as simple as they had expected. 
Also, North Koreans find failure in the eyes of their "own people" in the South more 
humiliating than it would be in a more foreign context.  For this reason, many hope to 
immigrate to the United States or countries other than South Korea. 
To better help North Koreans integrate into South Korean society, it is imperative 
to understand the psyche of the refugees.  The responsibility for failed integration is 
shared by both the North and South Koreans.  South Koreans are often unaware of the 
issues or have preconceived notions of North Koreans.  For the North Korean refugees, 
numerous factors come in to play. First is their inability to shed a lifetime of North 
Korean indoctrination after just a couple months in the Hanawon.  Second, North 
Koreans expect to procure jobs like they held in North Korea, and find it difficult to adapt 
to a different work ethic after being raised in an environment where everything was 
provided by the state.  Most importantly, refugees suffer from post-traumatic stress 
disorders as a result of their escape experiences and leaving their families behind. 
Shim focuses on the sociological impacts of North Koreans' inability to assimilate 
into South Korean culture, and discusses the implications for reunification. She stresses 
that understanding these sociological problems can improve policy towards North Korean 
refugees, not just for South Korea, but also for others in the international community. 
According to Shim,   
the first generation of North Korean refugees are a lost generation, 
permanently confused and disoriented.  However, this conclusion does not 
advocate abandoning the refugees.  Recommendations can be made to 
assist future refugees through research-based policy improvements.128   
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G. CONCLUSION 
Allowing North Koreans to emigrate legally could preclude a sudden change 
scenario that would cause a mass exodus of refugees from North Korea.  It is possible 
that North Koreans who immigrate to other countries and succeed would return and serve 
as the brainpower for economic and social development in North Korea.  Each of the Six-
Party nations has the ability to provide a hospitable environment for the North Koreans.  
Doing so would benefit each nation by enhancing regional stability and setting the stage 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 55
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
Why should the Six Party nations address the North Korean refugee issue?  The 
North Korean refugee issue is not just a humanitarian problem. A mass movement of 
refugees would likely accompany a sudden change scenario jeopardizing regional 
security.  Chapter II described problems the ROK and U.S. militaries would encounter in 
reacting to a refugee scenario.   Each Six Party nation has a responsibility to contribute to 
regional security.  If the triggers to a refugee flow are removed, regional security is 
enhanced.  The Six Party nations should collaborate on policies to reduce the triggers and 
improve regional security. 
Policies to allow refugees to work legally would contribute to this end.  If each 
country creates a guest worker policy and develops social programs to insure successful 
refugee assimilation, the immigrant population is more likely to provide information 
seepage back into North Korea and to eventually return to serve as brainpower for North 
Korean revitalization and development. 
This chapter presents an assimilation model for successful integration of North 
Korean refugees.  With the information presented in previous chapters as a foundation, 
the chapter describes how each country could customize the basic model to facilitate 
successful immigration and benefit the host country. 
A. A COMMON MODEL FOR NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE 
ASSIMILATION  
In “North Korean Diaspora:  North Korean Defectors Abroad and in South 
Korea,” Yoon In-Jin assesses assimilation issues for North Koreans.129  Intended to 
improve South Korean government policies and programs, his recommendations could 
well be implemented in other receiving countries.   
According to Yoon, North Korean immigrants’ ability to integrate involves three 
stages:  predeparture, overseas stay, and arrival and social adjustment. Refugees' 
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experiences in each stage can facilitate or hinder assimilation.  Yoon presents a matrix of 
two components of adjustment: mental adjustment and material adjustment. Mental 
adjustment is a “sense of belonging to host society as a full and equal member of 
society,” while material adjustment is “the acquisition of income, skills and jobs to lead 
an independent life in the host society.”130   
Success in both components is defined as “full adjustment” or “integration.”  
Success in material but not mental adjustment is classified as partial adjustment, which 
Yoon calls “isolation.” Failure in material adjustment and success in mental adjustment is 
also partial adjustment, identified as “acculturation.”  Failure in both components is 
“maladjustment” or “marginality."131   
There are thus four possible categories: full adjustment/integration, partial 
adjustment/isolation, partial adjustment/acculturation, and maladjustment/marginality. A 
majority of the North Koreans in South Korean society fall into the 
maladjustment/marginality category. The second most common is partial 
adjustment/isolation.  Very few achieve full adjustment/integration. Yoon calls partial 
adjustment/acculturation “a theoretical possibility without actual probability at this 
time.”132 
Yoon lists three social factors that affect a North Korean’s ability to adjust:  age, 
marital status, and family size.  Younger defectors adapt more quickly. Marrying a South 
Korean adds social connections and social support.  Families that defect together provide 
economic and emotional support to each other and are more likely to stabilize quickly. 
Additional social factors affecting assimilation include socioeconomic background, level 
of involvement by the immigrant's sponsor, and the political and economic climate of 
South Korea when the defector arrives in country.   
Using the history of each nation's relations with North Korea and the nature of its 
Korean diaspora, and applying Yoon’s model, this chapter offers policy suggestions to 
facilitate assimilation of North Korean refugees into each receiving country. 
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B.  BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE ASSIMILATION MODEL 
Because North Korean society allows little individual decision making and many 
services are provided by the government, immigrants face a wide gap between the social 
norms of their homeland and the country of resettlement.  Many issues challenge the 
successful integration of North Korean refugees.  An interdisciplinary team of doctors, 
counselors, educators, linguistic experts, demographers and economists could create a 
holistic approach to North Korean assimilation.  Language training, lessons on cultural 
integration, job skills development, educational opportunities, decision-making skills, 
budget management, counseling, and other programs would facilitate successful 
integration. 133 
Several models can serve as a starting point.  The ROK Ministry of Unification 
supports the Hanawon’s eight week course.  The website describes the course content: 
The resettlement program at Hanawon is an eight-week course for social 
adjustment in the South. The ultimate objective of the course is to instill 
confidence in the newcomers, narrow the cultural gap, and motivate them 
to achieve sustainable livelihoods in a new environment. The course has 
four blocks: 1) 27 hours on mental and physical health; 2) 130 hours of 
vocational training and counseling in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Labor; 3) 90 hours of education on the South's democracy and market 
economy; and 4) 33 hours on preparations for resettlement and moving out 
on their own. Furthermore, the government provides them with a variety 
of financial and non-financial support to assist them with resettlement. 
The newcomers receive, for example, an initial cash payment, incentives 
related to employment and education, medical support, and favorable 
terms for leasing apartments. The government also creates a new family 
registry as they are South Korean citizens with all rights and privileges 
under the Constitution.134   
 
                                                 
133 North Koreans face a language barrier in even South Korea.  Since the division more than 50 years 
ago, the Korean language developed independently in the north and south. Colloquial terminology differs 
dramatically, and South Koreans borrow many words from the English language, while the North Koreans 
do not.  
134 Ministry of Unification website, available at 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default.jsp?pgname=AFFhumanitarian_settlement, accessed 31 January 
2009.  
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In addition to South Korea's Hanawon model, Japan has a model it used in the 
1970s.  After the 1975 fall of Saigon, Japan provided refuge to 14,332 Vietnamese 
refugees, “not only on humanitarian grounds but also from the point of view of 
contributing to the peace and stability of the Southeast Asian region.”135  Japan has 
extended opportunities to over 10,000 Southeast Asian refugees since 1978, assisting 
assimilation with Japanese language training, classes on social integration and job 
placement assistance.136   
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIX-PARTY NATIONS 
1. Suggested Policy for China  
Due to the burgeoning problems of human trafficking and dishonest brokers who 
victimize North Korean refugees, the situation in China will worsen without government 
intervention. China should start by recognizing the marriages of North Korean women to 
Chinese men and give their children the same legal rights as residents.137  Although 
China does not need to increase its labor force, a guest worker program would alleviate 
the need to crack down on illegal refugees in the shared border region.   
China claims it repatriates the North Koreans out of respect for North Korea’s 
sovereignty.  A guest worker policy would not impinge on North Korea’s sovereignty and 
would provide a productive, humane environment for immigrants working in China so 
they can provide for their families in North Korea.  In addition, as more South Korean 
businesses invest in China, North Koreans with work permits could provide niche 
capabilities to foster South Korean business development. 
 
 
                                                 
135 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pamph2000_archive/refugee.html, accessed 8 July 2008. 
136  Ibid. 
137 Due to China’s one child policy, Chinese men far outnumber Chinese women and have difficulty 
finding marriage partners.  Sharon La Franier, “Chinese Bias for Baby Boys Creates a Gap of 32 Million,” 
New York Times, April 10, 2009, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/11/world/asia/11china.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=china%20boys&st=cse, 
accessed 16 April 2009.  
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2. Suggested Policy for Japan 
In 2006, Japan passed “The Law on Countermeasures to the Abduction Problem 
and other Problems of Human Rights Violations by the North Korean Authorities,” 
referred to as “The North Korean Human Rights Act."138  The Japanese legislation pales 
in comparison to the U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act of 2003.  With its politically-
inspired focus on the refugee issue, the Japanese law has little depth in dealing with the 
suffering of the North Korean people, and offers no commitment of resources.   
Implementation of a more sound policy for refugee assimilation might help 
resolve Japanese worker shortages.  Institutionalized job training and placement for North 
Korean immigrants could help alleviate Japan's domestic worker shortage caused by its 
aging population.  Improved policy can also help Japan counter its negative reputation 
from World War II.  Haruhisa Ogawa, a North Korean expert and human rights advocate, 
says, “The way Japan handles [the North Korean refugee] situation is crucial for its 
international image.”139 A number of Japanese NGOs are dedicated to helping North 
Koreans; collaboration between these groups and the South Korean government would 
build relationships and help heal old wounds.  
In case of a North Korea regime collapse and mass exodus of refugees, Japan’s 
close proximity means that “boat people” may reach its shores.140 Inadequate 
immigration policy and emergency reception plans would have disastrous consequences. 
Japan’s ability to handle such a scenario would be greatly enhanced by appropriate 
planning and preparation.   
Japan is a major economic player in Asia with strong military capabilities. Its Self 
Defense Forces have supported humanitarian and peacekeeping operations around the 
                                                 
138 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Refugees, Abductees, ‘Returnees’:  Human Rights in Japan-North Korea 
Relations,” Asia Pacific Journal:  Japan Focus, 29 March 2009, available at  http://www.japanfocus.org/-
Tessa-Morris_Suzuki/3110, accessed 1 April 2009. 
139 Quoted in Suvendrini Kakuchi, “Japan:  Refugees from North Korea are a Test for Tokyo,” Global 
Information Network, 29 January 2003, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-71363895.html, 
accessed 1 May 2009.   
140 Tessa Morris-Suzuki discusses a scenario where “economic and political crisis in North Korea 
might generate a wave of 300,000 refugees sweeping, tsunami like, onto Japan’s shores.”  It is predicted 
that most of these refugees will be the original (or relatives of) ethnic Koreans who were living in Japan, 
but were repatriated back to North Korea from 1959 to 1984.  See Tessa Morris-Suzuki, above. 
 60
world.141 To offset its neighbors’ fears of reemerging Japanese militarism, the 
government should continue to support humanitarian operations and emphasize the 
Japanese desire for regional peace by committing resources to the North Korean refugees.  
Improving legislation on North Korean human rights and using the model for integrating 
Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s would help Japan achieve these goals.    
Japan should focus only on the North Korean refugee issue in its North Korean 
Human Rights Act, and resist the temptation to make refugee assistance contingent on 
resolution of the abductee issue.  This is not because the abductee issue is insignificant, 
but because conditions should not be placed on refugee assistance.  The strength of the 
policy stems from the collective efforts of the regional players implementing the common 
model.  If each country were to attach a conditional resolution of a bilateral issue, the 
effect is watered down.  According to one refugee interviewed by this author, the DPRK 
regime spends a lot of energy rattling the cage on the nuclear issue to distract attention 
from what would really negatively impact their regime, and that is the North Korean 
refugees.  Japanese contributions to resolving this crisis would also likely resolve issues 
surrounding the abductions. 
3. Suggested Policy for Russia 
The Russian government at the federal level allows North Korean loggers to keep 
their passports. They can travel freely throughout Russia and to other countries as long as 
they do not commit crimes, and the Russians will even repatriate them to South Korea. 
However, local Russian officials work hand in hand with the North Korean police who 
monitor the North Korean laborers. Local Russian officials either do not know or ignore 
the rights of North Koreans, including the right of access to the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Russia should they want asylum.142  The Russian government 
at the federal level should increase awareness of local government officials and make 
policies for fairer working conditions for North Korean laborers.   
                                                 
141 This PBS website has a concise summary of the Japan Self Defense Force deployments in support 
of various peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, logistical support, and homeland defense operations.  
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/japans-about-face/map-japans-self-defense-forces-
deployments/1275/, accessed 1 April 2009. 
142 Meyer, 509.  
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A more positive situation would emerge from creating a guest worker visa policy, 
mandating more favorable work conditions, and insisting that laborers be chosen 
selectively rather than forcibly assigned to Russia as punishment.  With such changes, 
fewer laborers would flee. The guest worker program could serve as a pressure release 
valve for North Korea, giving its people more options for finding work and providing for 
their families. The overall economic relationship between Russia and North Korea would 
be enhanced.  
This could improve North Korean and Russian collaboration on the Iron Silk 
Road project.  Russia wants to connect the Trans-Siberian Railroad to the inter-Korean 
railway system in order to move exports from South Korea through Russia and into 
Europe, a project that would greatly benefit the entire region.143  Strengthening the South 
Korean, North Korean and Russian relationship would also provide a firmer economic 
foundation for a unified Korean peninsula sometime in the future. 
 Russian leadership on the Iron Silk Road project could strengthen its position in 
territorial disputes with Japan. Given Korea’s history with Japan, increased economic 
cooperation between Russia and Korea means that Korea would likely support Russia in 
its territorial disputes with Japan, especially since Korea and Japan have similar 
disagreements over territory.    
 In The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers, Seung-Ho Joo calls Russia 
an “honest broker and facilitator for Korean peace.”  
Russia spoke up on behalf of the DPRK in international gatherings, 
offered good offices between the two Koreas and between North Korea 
and Japan/the U.S., and suggested compromise solutions to the DPRK and 
the U.S.  Russia’s role in this regard has been quite visible and fairly 
positive but failed to lead to a breakthrough in the deadlocked relationship 
between the U.S. and the DPRK.  The key to Korean peace is still in the 
hands of North Korea and U.S.144  
Russia has less influence in the Six Party talks than China, Japan and South 
Korea, but even compared with China, Russia arguably has the strongest, most positive 
                                                 
143 Joo and Kwak, “Military Relations Between Russia and North Korea,” 10. 
144 Tae-Kwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, editors, The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), 155.    
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relationship with North Korea.  Russia is North Korea's major benefactor, and a large 
number of North Koreans work in the Russian Far East (primarily in the lumber industry 
in Vladivostok) to pay off North Korea's debt. Workers are exported to Russia and 
monitored by North Koreans.  Poorly treated and overworked, they suffer frequent 
serious injuries, and even deaths.  Many times, they try to defect, and some North Korean 
refugees in China, fearing capture by Chinese authorities, seek asylum in Russia after 
hearing that Russian authorities are more willing to help. The Russian government, 
though more lenient than the Chinese government, has a mixed record of assisting these 
refugees, and has returned captured refugees to North Korea to avoid aggravating 
Russian–North Korean relations. 
 To reduce suffering, give workers an incentive to stay and decrease defection 
rates, Russia could implement a program allowing North Koreans in the logging industry 
to earn land rights and to build a house after a specified tenure. 
4. Suggested Policy for the United States 
The highest concentrations of expatriate Koreans are in the United States.  Many 
faith-based organizations provide assistance to the recent immigrants. Some North 
Koreans want to immigrate to the United States to join relatives who can provide 
assistance and family support.  Because many who immigrated in the 1960s came from 
North Korea, there is less discrimination to inhibit the assimilation of new North Korean 
immigrants into Korean–American communities.  As far as assimilation into the 
mainstream U.S. population, America's cultural tradition as a melting pot makes the 
social environment more conducive to acceptance than homogeneous societies like Japan. 
The United States committed to developing sound policy with the North Korean 
Human Rights Act of 2004, but implementation has been slow.  As of 2008, only 64 
North Koreans are resettled in the United States under provisions of the legislation.145  
The 2008 NKHRA reauthorization bill renewed the funding provided in the original bill 
 
 
                                                 
145 Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Congress and U.S. Policy on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees:  
Recent Legislation and Implementation” (CRS Report for Congress, October 22, 2008), 4. 
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and elevated the special envoy's status to the equivalent of an ambassador. More 
energetic application of the NKHRA would improve the outlook for North Korean 
refugees to the United States.  
5. Suggested Policy for the Republic of Korea 
South Korea is the default destination for many North Korean refugees.  South 
Korea considers all Koreans from North Korea to be legal citizens.  Of all the countries, 
South Korea has accepted the most North Koreans, and has the most comprehensive 
program for integrating them into South Korean society.   
South Korea could take more steps to improve the situation, including 
collaborating with other countries to accept refugees.  Such collaboration should include 
sharing social lessons learned and assisting other countries in conducting security checks.  
The collective goal should be successful assimilation of North Koreans wherever they 
choose to resettle.  South Korea cannot possibly absorb all the North Korean defectors. 
When North Koreans immigrate to other countries, they expand their world view; broader 
experience will be useful when the refugees return to help rebuild North Korea, 
benefiting both North and South Korea. 
 South Korea can also improve integration of immigrants with greater efforts to 
educate their own population. More refugee awareness could help South Koreans 
overcome their biases against North Koreans. The South Korean government should 
advocate fairness and non-discrimination.  The future of the Korean peninsula depends 
on successful integration of North Koreans. An accepting and open-minded society 
makes successful integration more likely.   
D. CONCLUSION 
North Korea faces another severe food shortage from flood damage sustained in 
the 2007 rainy season.  Unless it can meet the basic needs for food and security, and 
provide for the health and welfare of its populace, the regime risks collapse.  If North 
Korea can be convinced to implement programs so its citizens can work legally in China, 
Russia, Japan and the ROK, such programs could relieve pressure on the North Korean 
government by giving its citizens the means to feed their families in North Korea. 
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The North Korean economy would improve with the assistance of the other Six 
Party nations, which would invite European investment.  This, in turn, would facilitate 
construction of an Iron Silk Road, resulting in prosperity for the whole region. North 
Korea should be persuaded that its geographic location gives it the key to realizing this 
dream.   
The difficulty for such programs lies in convincing North Korea to allow citizen 
participation. Since the regime relies on population control to maintain power, it is 
inconceivable that they would allow their citizens to leave the country freely.  However, 
thousands leave North Korea without permission.  The North Korean regime will not last 
forever, and when the time comes for a successor, a window of opportunity may open for 
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